One of the most common misconceptions is the idea of the state as an organization—a system of boxes with arrows between them that can be created or changed at will by those who govern it. These boxes and arrows have no interests of their own; it is assumed that the goals and interests are invested in them by those who create or use the system.
This notion is so widespread that even quite sophisticated minds regularly fall into its trap. Of course, all of this can and should be examined in detail; here I simply want to draw attention to the problem.
The idea of the state as a system designed to solve precisely the tasks it officially proclaims is not merely a misconception but a dangerous one. The danger lies in the fact that this idea keeps tripping people up on the same rake, preventing them from searching for other paths. After all, if the state is merely a system that we can change at will, then we have only two problems: the right people in the system and the right system—that is, the right boxes and the right arrows between them. If the state is one, albeit quite extensive, organization, then our efforts should be directed toward improving access to the system (all these elections and referendums) in order to bring in the right people, and toward designing the boxes and arrows.
The grip of this misconception is such that it compels the “progressive public” to work on the right people and the boxes with arrows between them year after year, despite the fact that the track record of its efforts is completely described by the formula “once again, nothing worked out.” And if the state is merely an organization, then the conclusion that the progressive public draws from this fact amounts to “we just need to try harder.” And so they try.
Yet the progressive public usually ignores the experience of the “developed countries”—it simply believes in them and believes that things are good there. If it had taken the trouble to familiarize itself with the real state of affairs in these countries in the field of “state building,” it would have been horrified to discover there not only “chaos and turmoil” but also painfully familiar situations and trends. That is, we are not talking about some purely Ukrainian peculiarities but about systemic regularities.
I will try to show as briefly as possible what the essence of the problem is.
A particular stable structure forms around activities that bring regular profit (regardless of what form it takes). For example, a shop selling certain goods includes sellers, the owner, and possibly certain managers dealing with supplies, storage, and so on. Economically speaking, the shop is only part of a structure, but for our purposes, an ordinary everyday approach is sufficient. For instance, a bookstore “Black Books” can be described as “buy books—sell books,” and it, as an organization, is not difficult to depict as several boxes with arrows between them.
With the state, everything is different, because it produces nothing and bears no costs. Nevertheless, here too a structure forms around activities that bring profit. This profit is income from taxation in the broad sense of the word; to obtain it, one needs to expand the pretexts for new taxation, and it is by no means necessary that the activity declared as the pretext for new taxation and new budgets actually be carried out. State medicine is not obligated to treat you, state education is not obligated to teach you, and state police are not obligated to protect you—their existence is primarily a pretext for the corresponding budgets, and their activity is secondary. If we understand this circumstance, we will make a great leap forward in understanding the nature of the state and the problems we face.
However, the real picture is much more complex. In this example, there is still a hint of an organization or group of organizations, but in reality, the profit-generating activity is carried out not only within certain formal organizations (ministries and departments)—rather, it is built around, sorry for the jargon, “themes” that are exploited by various groups of officials. Within one formal organization (the same ministry), several groupings may exist that exploit different “themes”; these groupings may extend far beyond a single department, compete, and openly struggle with each other, and so on. That is, the real structure of the state is built around “themes” and is not determined by the functions of its formal parts. And if we understand this, we understand that this structure is mobile and changeable, and no boxes and arrows will help us describe it. For the “ordinary” open economy, “themes” are called markets, and the acting subjects, as a rule, coincide in this case with the organizations operating in these markets—that is, corporations, and more broadly, legal entities. However, no one would think of drawing arrows between them and claiming that by changing the boxes and arrows we can achieve some results. Everyone understands that the existing arrangement of boxes and arrows is temporary. The same needs to be understood with regard to the state—its analysis should be conducted as we analyze markets. At the same time, it has a number of peculiarities. First, it is not a single organization but a conglomerate; second, the real structures of the state do not coincide with the formal ones; third, these structures themselves and the relationships between them are constantly changing.
Well, now try to “reform” all of this.