In the previous note1 we discussed the insurmountable obstacle to candidate promises in the form of Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Its unsurmountability consists of two factors. The first is that the candidate will not be able to deliver on his promises, since he lacks the authority to do so. The second is that if he decides to expand his powers, he will have to face the problem of amending the Constitution. The poor fellow, instead of saving us, will have to deal with evil deputies and other nonsense. How such a struggle will end is unknown; in any case, our salvation is postponed again, and, by the way, no one guarantees that even after obtaining the coveted powers, the president exhausted from the struggle will remember us, sinners.
True, despite all these circumstances and the fact that the majority of candidates are running for the position of a wizard, not the president of Ukraine, their programs are important, and from them one can easily tell how the candidate will act in the office of president. Additionally, and we will discuss this in this note, the programs are a kind of summary of what Ukraine actually needs, or rather, what is needed “for the people” from the perspective of those who intend to become its representatives. This is very important and indicative information.
So, what does a Ukrainian look like, in the candidates’ opinion? What concerns him? The author has divided the candidates’ opinions into three groups: general problems, “trends of the season,” and a group of retro problems.
General Problems
The first group is problems of a “general nature,” which almost all candidates discuss.
Almost all, namely Bohoslovska, Brodsky, Hrytsenko, Lytvin, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, and Yushchenko, have separate sections in their programs about our health. It is understandable—being the president of a country without a population is somehow not very healthy. At the same time, none of them promises free medicine. This assumes that we should first pay officials for our health, and they will decide how much and to which doctors the money should go.
Ukrainians also consider it their duty to talk about agriculture, without forgetting to mention that Ukraine should become the breadbasket of Europe. Most of them are also concerned about “education and science problems.” And almost no one forgets about the glorious Armed Forces.
Foreign policy also occupies Ukrainians. True, this sphere somehow falls within the president’s competence, so candidates are practically mandated by God to express their views, which, in most cases, they did. Bohoslovska, Lytvin, Moroz, and Yanukovych advocate for neutrality; Kostenko and Yushchenko are for NATO, and Hrytsenko proposes introducing a five-year moratorium on joining any alliance2.
Ukrainians and presidential candidates are also concerned about local government. Bohoslovska promises to return executive committees to local self-government, Hrytsenko directly states that “power is transferred to the localities,” which in his case manifests in the elimination of district administrations and determining the shares remaining with local authorities from each tax, as well as creating executive committees at the regional and district levels, Moroz promises to eliminate district administrations. Most of the others also do not forget about local authorities but are not as decisive as their colleagues.
In the economy, Ukrainians want protectionism, that is, protection of the domestic producer from the domestic consumer. Bohoslovska, Moroz, Lytvin, Ratushnyak, Pabat, Tyhypko, and Yatsenyuk inform us about this. Kostenko moderately supports them.
Ukrainians also want interventionism. That is, they want the state to build factories itself, and then they will work in them. Yatsenyuk with his “new course” is the most confident about this. Bohoslovska and Tyhypko also think so, and Tymoshenko is already doing all this, but the crisis prevented her from developing nanotechnology. Why nanotechnology? It seems to me, because the word is funny and easy to remember. But, generally speaking, without a doubt, Ukrainians want the state to collect money from them, decide itself what and why to build with that money, while not forgetting, of course, about the nanotechnology that simply will not appear otherwise.
At the same time, Ukrainians also want lower taxes. Bohoslovska, Tyhypko, and Yanukovych promise this most actively. Some even promise tax holidays for small businesses. Bohoslovska proposes replacing the unpopular VAT with a sales tax, and Hrytsenko—with a turnover tax. Yanukovych shines with precision when he promises to reduce VAT to 17%.
Ukrainians would also like simplified procedures for business. Bohoslovska promises a declaration-based system, Hrytsenko promises to eliminate the tax police and simplify registration, Kostenko proposes that small enterprises pay taxes twice a year. Tyhypko simply promises but not specifically, apparently understanding that there may not be enough money for building factories.
Ukrainians really dislike corruption. This is evident from the fact that every candidate considers it his duty to speak in its favor… sorry, about it. Everyone promises the strictest measures and differs from each other only in the set of these measures. If someone simply promises to “fight mercilessly,” then Hrytsenko immediately specifies that for ten thousand dollars a bureaucrat will sit for 15 years. Well, you get the picture.
But more than anything in the world, Ukrainians are afraid, not of corruption, but of land. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the candidates’ views on land ownership. Only Viktor Andriyovych and Kostenko who joined him speak of the land market, but this, apparently, is out of desperation. The majority of the rest fly into hysterics and explain something incoherently and rapidly. Pabat expressed the essence of this thinking best. He plainly stated that “the loss of land leads to the loss of statehood.” Apparently, that’s usually how it goes.
Trends of the Season
All the listed items are and have been found in any program of any candidate for the past 20 years. But each election has its own unique “trends,” prompted by the specifics of the current moment.
I would never have thought that the main trend of this season is… strategic enterprises (in Hrytsenko’s case—industries). Hrytsenko, Kostenko, Lytvin, Moroz, Pabat, and Yatsenyuk tell us about them.
What this is and why it is needed, I did not understand until I read Yatsenyuk’s program. Arseniy naively informs us that “income from super-profitable and strategic enterprises remains with the state, and this will provide real freedom for the development of private initiative and allow the lifting of the tax burden.” I admit, I reread this phrase several times until I understood what was going on. Everything turned out to be very simple. Look. The guys need to be fed somehow. So, we will slip them the income from strategic enterprises instead of taxes, and we ourselves will live it up!
The second most frequently mentioned is the fight against bureaucrats. Hrytsenko devoted his entire program to this, Brodsky—half of it. Well, actually, the trend of the season is the idea of declarations of income and expenses of officials and their family members. Why didn’t I put the merciless fight against corruption in “trends of the season”? Because it has been mercilessly ongoing for 20 years in every election.
The problem of the electoral system is also close to the Ukrainian and is one of the trends of the season. Bohoslovska thinks that, well, we’ve tried proportional representation, that’s enough. True, she proposes returning to majoritarian representation gradually, first implementing a system of “50% majoritarian seats and 50% list seats.” Lytvin, Tymoshenko, Tyhypko, Yushchenko, and Yatsenyuk insist on so-called “open lists.”
The problem of immunity is reflected in Bohoslovska, Hrytsenko, Lytvin, and Yushchenko, who proposes canceling it for everyone.
Decisive constitutional reform and a presidential republic are promised to us by Hrytsenko, Yushchenko, and Tyhypko. Indecisive reform is promised by Tymoshenko and Suprun.
There is also the problem of “external testing” and 12-year education. Bohoslovska and Hrytsenko promise to return to the 10-year system. Bohoslovska together with Yanukovych is against “mindless copying” of the Bologna system, but Yushchenko—out of spite—is for it.
A novelty of the season is also a significantly greater number of conspiracies against the candidates’ souls. In addition to the well-deserved conspiracies of Tyahnybok and Symonenko, whom non-Ukrainians and non-proletarians обижают (don’t confuse who—who), we are now openly and directly told that oligarchs are to blame for everything. Ratushnyak, Tymoshenko, Pabat, and Yatsenyuk think so. The latter, true, calls oligarchs by their scientific name, “big capital.” But Pabat is again the most convincing. He, for example, does not doubt that “we are a hardworking people, therefore unemployment is an artificial phenomenon.” That is, Ukrainians—they work. And if they are not specifically irradiated with electricity, they will always work, and there will be no unemployment. Well, you understand who organized all this, right?
Surprisingly, the housing and utilities problem worries few Ukrainians. Bohoslovska promises that in 4 years everyone will be provided with heat and water, and Tyhypko will create a special committee that will determine prices for this stuff.
Retro
Retro topics include themes that were once popular but suddenly resurface during elections.
The most typical retro topic is the language. Most candidates again promise not to suppress the Russian language. It would seem it has long been clear that no one will ever fulfill these promises, but apparently, candidates hope that someone will believe them.
Another retro topic, quite unexpected for me, became the topic of a “transit country.” It consists in the idea that by creating certain infrastructure, the state will earn money from people traveling back and forth through it. It seems logical, but this topic, fashionable in the early 90s, has always remained only a programmatic point.
Lytvin proposes to “analyze” the results of privatization, supported by Ratushnyak. The latter, by the way, wants to “return nuclear status,” he is not at all embarrassed that one cannot return what never existed.
Conclusions
Well, what can be said here. A Ukrainian cannot take a step without the state. He is ready to feed and water it, just so it… I find it difficult to continue. In general, just so it. He is even ready to give it “strategic enterprises” so that it doesn’t go hungry. True, the Ukrainian is quite cunning. For example, from this deal, he intends to get income in the form of unpaid taxes. And, by the way, he strongly desires that they ensure him income, whether in the form of various benefits or in the form of business profits. At the same time, he is categorically against competing with various non-Ukrainians (if you can’t ban other Ukrainians) and demands protectionism. He himself does not want to (or cannot) develop, build his business, and think strategically; he believes that the state should do this using income from taxes, which will increase when taxes are reduced. A large part of him is ready to work at one big state-factory under the management of a director-president. But most importantly, everything should be fair, there should be no bribes, corruption, or immunity, and a firm hand should govern all. A significant part of the Ukrainian takes this idea to its logical conclusion, asserting that one just needs to take and divide everything, the main thing is to appoint the guilty party, who will get nothing in the division.
This is what a Ukrainian looks like through the eyes of presidential candidates. It remains to be seen how much this image corresponds to reality.