The introduction of the euro was not a logical stage that followed the EMS. The existence of the EMS did not in any way presuppose the emergence of a single European currency. It was not economic expediency and the development of the EMS practice—which turned out to be a failure, since it ended with a currency band of 15%, which, to put it mildly, bore little resemblance to fixed rates—that led to the appearance of the euro. The euro emerged as a result of a political compromise between proponents of integration and groups supporting the Bundesbank. This compromise consisted of the following: on the one hand, the participating countries lost their monetary sovereignty, transferring the right of issuance to the newly created European Central Bank. On the other hand, in order to persuade the Germans to join the project, the ECB was endowed with corresponding independence, a single goal of “price level maintenance” was set before it, it was prohibited from purchasing bonds of participating countries, and from providing financial assistance to countries and companies in order to prevent bankruptcy (the “no bailout” rule). That is, the ECB was a kind of weaker version of the Bundesbank.
All this was solemnly formalized in the Maastricht Agreements, and in 1999 the euro appeared on the European financial scene. In reality, Maastricht and the euro were a defeat for Germany and the Bundesbank and a victory for Eurocrats. It is understandable that in Germany itself there were powerful forces—such as trade unions or the German automotive industry—which were also more interested in integration than in a strong mark, since they now dictated pan-European standards in their industries and gained opportunities to limit competition in their favor.
It is interesting that by that time European states had somewhat changed their priorities in ways of ensuring their livelihood. Before the EMS, inflation was such a priority. The Bundesbank greatly tempered the inflationary appetites of states, but they found a new El Dorado in the form of government borrowing (one could reduce government expenditures, but who would agree to that!). Government debt began to grow everywhere precisely during the existence of the EMS and after it. Therefore, the introduction of the euro was not marked, as expected, by inflation growth—states were satisfied with the practice of borrowing.