Readers may still remember Putin’s statement that he could take Kyiv in two weeks. Many took this as bravado and an empty threat. In reality, if one really wanted to, Kyiv could be taken much faster—within days—if one struck well from the north. In the current situation (in the current state of our army), this is not such a difficult task. The whole question is why do this, and the fact that Kyiv has not yet been attacked indicates that the war with Russia has one very specific characteristic.
It consists in the fact that Putin does not need territorial capture; he needs an acceptable political solution. “Capture” and everything else is merely a means to this end. At the same time, this solution is a solution to the conflict between Russia and some (known only to Putin) “West.” Ukraine, for Putin, is simply a means in this conflict. Therefore, for Russia it is extremely important that the results of the war with Ukraine are recognized by the West. “The return of Ukraine to Russia’s orbit” is the goal of this war. That is, of course, one can bomb everything here, blow it all up, and “capture Kyiv,” but this will not create “a new place for Russia in the world” and Ukraine will not be able to “return to the orbit.” All these “places” and “orbits” will appear only under one condition: when the Ukrainian authorities recognized by the West agree to peace on Putin’s terms.
That is, the main object of attack is not “Ukraine,” but its state “elite.” Escalation of the conflict (which can quite well reach the level of massive bombings of cities, “capture of Kyiv,” and opening nuclear briefcases) is directly linked to the willingness of the Ukrainian authorities to resist. And this is precisely where our main problem lies, if we do not want to live under Putin.
Let me note that if Russia were fighting the Ukrainians, that is, if the defense ministry said: “here are the keys to the warehouse, and we’re off,” Russia would have absolutely no chances at all, since the Ukrainians would not calm down until they had driven the occupiers from their territory.
I am aware of what most readers are thinking right now, but believe me, all these tanks and even “tank columns,” all these planes and even little missiles are not the main problem. A complexly organized structure (society) always “defeats” a simple structure (an army) all other things being equal. The question is precisely in these “other things being equal,” that is, roughly speaking, in how prepared society is to resist. In my view, it is quite prepared, and this is not about the number of volunteers ready to fight, but about the number of people who think differently from the majority of Russians.
Victory in war is not achieved in a competition of “who knocked out more little tanks”; it is achieved by inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy, unacceptable above all politically. And the whole question here is who will seek and try various ways to inflict this damage: the “market”—that is, a multitude of independent people interested in the end result—or the leadership, which is only concerned with reporting (knocked-out little tanks and captured cities).
All this leads to the following. In discussions of military confrontation, most people unconsciously proceed from assumptions about “total war” and therefore easily horrify themselves with figures demonstrating the superiority of the Russian army over the Ukrainian one. From this it is not far to the conclusion that resistance is useless and “it is necessary to seek diplomatic ways to resolve the issue,” which is usually a substitute for the word “surrender.” However, there is no total war, since (so far) Putin’s goal is the capitulation of the Ukrainian leadership, not the physical destruction of Ukraine. Moreover, even in the case of large-scale war, Russia has very little chance against Ukrainian civil society, and the less this society is hindered by the state, the less chance Russia has. Therefore, when you hear proposals to surrender, consider that there are no objective reasons for this.