About the Elections

However much the author of these lines would like to write about something significant and useful, it appears he will have to write about the upcoming elections—or more precisely, about their consequences¹.

In several points I will try to outline the features of the situation. These are mere observations, not a thorough analysis.

The Donetsk Crowd and Its Human Face

Essentially, at the deepest level, the course of events is shaped by the rupture of the “social contract” that existed before Yanukovych. Let me remind you that it consisted of the authorities not particularly interfering in citizens’ private lives and showing a certain willingness to bend the rules on economic matters. In exchange, citizens showed loyalty to the system, contenting themselves with the ritual sacrifice of political figures. The trouble with Yanukovych and the Donetsk crowd in general was that in Donbas ordinary law operated differently from Ukrainian law—much closer to the Russian model—and in this sense, the power of the Donetsk people was indeed anti-Ukrainian. Yanukovych put his hand in ordinary people’s pockets and made corruption inaccessible to many. This doomed him to a sad ending. From the very beginning, Poroshenko has been trying to build his presidency on the basis of the immortal “everything will be like in grandmother’s time”—that is, like under Kuchma and Yushchenko. He is trying to play the role of an arbiter-president, typical of Ukrainian feudal politics. This explains his personnel choices, his attempts to reach an agreement with Putin, and his general orientation toward “peace at any price” and toward “harmony and tranquility.” However, the peculiarity of the moment is that the executive branch continues the Yanukovych-Azarov policy—only in some completely berserk version of economic destruction. It remains unclear to what extent the policies of the Kuchma-Yushchenko era are even viable now. They were based on “budget raiding” and moderate milking of the population, while the top echelons parasitized on gas, which to a significant extent allowed them to keep their hands out of Ukrainians’ pockets. Conditions had already changed under Yanukovych, who, faced with choosing between cutting appetites and violating the contract, chose the latter—and paid for it.

At the same time, one must understand that reducing government spending, which might help return to the good old days of the “corruption consensus,” is hindered not so much by the resistance of those whom it might affect (let me remind you that the lion’s share of budget expenditures are “social” expenditures), but by those who are currently raiding them. The art of the arbiter-president, the role Poroshenko is trying to play, consists not in changes but in the skillful reshuffling from place to place of representatives of various interests. But this game only works when those representatives see for themselves a rich field of work raiding budget rivers. When those rivers dry up, the game loses its purpose. This is the main reason why “reforms from above” are impossible.

The Suckers Rebelled

A feature of the situation is that the public no longer wishes to wait for the bosses to figure out reforms. This is a rather rare situation—ordinary people actually craving reforms. It is clear that the public has only the vaguest idea of what these reforms would entail, but fact is fact. If the authorities had sent a clear signal that corruption would again be cheap and accessible, I think the public would have gone along, because anyone prefers inaction to action. But such a signal cannot be sent for the reason set forth in the previous point; Poroshenko is trying to imitate it, or more precisely, he reproduces behavior typical of a situation where corruption is cheap, but the government cuts the effect of this signal at the root. That is, the social contract has already been broken by both sides; the “population” no longer wants to be a passive victim, an object for power manipulation.

Putin and the War

It remains unclear how events will develop further, but if it is true that Putin has set a course for “political destabilization,” then this is very good. For Ukrainians, the “chaos” that is so destructive for Russians is familiar and beneficial; it goes hand in hand with economic growth and progress, because during such times authorities are busy fighting each other, which allows the Ukrainian to quietly tend his little garden. Here one needs to play along with Vladimir Vladimirovich with all one’s might—to be scared, to make round eyes, and to cry that all is lost. However, I think there will be no need to try particularly hard here, because the game of “who here is for Putin” will most likely become the main content of the future Rada’s work. Since conspiracism knows no bottom, anyone can be accused of being “for Putin,” an infinite number of times over (each time in a new scheme). This creates fertile ground for Shuster, politicians and political fans, and distracts them all from doing us any good—which is the main condition for survival and subsequent growth.

Recovery

The current elections clearly show that there are no circumstances that can force the authorities and those aspiring to power to come to their senses and return to reality. Ukrainian politics is dead, and, in my observation, has been so since around 2002. The question is when a significant number of people will understand this and become the catalyst for a new agenda. The first sign, I think, will be when discussions of Shuster (or whatever replaces him) cease on Facebook. Once the regulars there stop doing this, in six months to a year we can expect the emergence of a new agenda.

Forecast

The absence of a social contract—that is, of shared ideas about what the state can do to citizens and what citizens can do to the state—means a process of searching for a new one. This is a lengthy and highly inertial process, because this contract is not invented but gradually takes shape. In Ukrainian society, a literal movement of tectonic plates has begun, which will not end quickly. Therefore, any forecasts here are highly unreliable, and results are local. Even if Poroshenko managed to make the population believe that corruption would work again as before, this would simply be a brief pause on the path of searching for a new contract. Well, and elections to some Rada look against this backdrop an extremely insignificant event. And if about the previous Rada, elected under the monopoly of the Regions, one could say it would not sit out its term, this applies even more to the next one. Well, and for those who want to know when all of this will end, I will say: when a sufficient number of people understand that “нам своє робити” (we must do our own thing) and stop participating in this circus. The sooner this happens, the sooner the “social contract” will be found—possibly without the participation of any bosses whatsoever.