I will try in this column, simply and in a few words, to show what the problem of “federalization” consists of today and whether there can be any long-term benefit from its solution.
First, two remarks need to be made. The first. In my view, not two, but three sides are acting in the conflict with Russia. The first two are the states of “Russia” and “Ukraine,” that is, Putin and a large group of Ukrainian officials; the third side is Ukrainian society, which rose against its “own” state at Maidan and drove out the budding dictator Yanukovych. These sides have different interests in the conflict; we will talk about how they are refracted in “federalism.”
The second remark concerns federalism proper. This is a very little-known phenomenon in our country (approximately as little-known as republicanism). Usually “federalism” is understood as a variant of “administrative-territorial division,” in which “territories” enjoy certain rights that are believed to exceed those in the “usual” arrangement. This view is quite naive and even erroneous, but nevertheless it is the dominant one. In connection with this understanding, the old song lives and flourishes that federations are “weaker” than unitary states. For all those interested in the question, I send them to read Tocqueville, and for the rest I will say that “federalism” and “strength” are concepts from different coordinate systems. One can, of course, point out that the most “powerful” countries—the USA in the world and Germany in Europe—are federations. But Britain, when it was queen of the seas, was not a federation. However, it was decentralized to such a degree that the political scientists of that time (and, it seems, Tocqueville himself) wrote that Britain actually had no administration. In general, there is no connection between “federalism” and “strength.” However, the correlation between “prosperous,” “developed” and “decentralized,” “low-bureaucracy” always exists. After all, those who wish to argue about “strength” and “weakness” can go to the field trials that the bureaucratic system is currently undergoing, in which every janitor is appointed from Kyiv.
Now about our sides in the conflict. Russia’s interest is Putin’s interest. What is going on in his head, he himself probably does not understand. Therefore, one has to be guided by the repeatedly officially stated position, which insists on the federalization of Ukraine. Why is Putin for federalization? The idea here is simple—federalization, again in its understanding as “administrative-territorial division,” will allow, as Putin thinks, to finally return Ukraine to the orbit of the Russian Federation. Putin is playing geopolitics and strategic games on our territory. He is convinced that the West is fighting him, that the West organized and paid for Maidan, he fears “NATO on Russia’s borders,” and so on and so forth. In the case of a “federal” arrangement, regions receive more opportunities to influence the domestic and foreign policy of the country. For example, an upper chamber of parliament inevitably appears, consisting of representatives of the “subjects of the federation.” This upper chamber must approve bills just like the lower one. Thus, as Putin believes, through the eastern and southern regions, which are in the majority, it will be easy to make Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU impossible, and then peacefully attach it to some new version of the USSR. Moreover, federalism in such execution opens doors for actual control through local “elites” over eastern regions. Roughly speaking, “federalization” means that Putin wants to control Ukraine’s foreign policy and the eastern regions, while at the same time not bearing responsibility for them, leaving them “on the balance sheet” of Ukraine.
“Ukraine,” or rather, a group of officials who are currently in power, traditionally opposes federalism. However, for completely different reasons than those that guide Putin when he is “for.” The reasons here are not so much in a pathological love for centralization and a striving for reforms, which centralism allegedly helps with, as in a love for monopoly. Every authority, every position is a reason for increasing one’s power. Centralization is needed to grant and revoke, to execute and pardon. This public does not wish to learn to steal finely and elegantly, as in Europe. Therefore, the system “I am the boss, you are a fool” suits crude and overbearing theft best of all. In federalism, officials see a threat to their monopoly—a threat that they will have to share power and the opportunities that follow from it.
Well, what about the third side? It is clear that “society” is not a subject. In this case, I am trying to speak about the opinion of those who supported Maidan. I think that the common interest of all these people, reasoning within our topic, is the absence of Putin as their boss. A significant number of these people, I think, would agree that for this it would be good to resolve the issue of eastern Ukraine, which requires federalization. At the same time, it is clear that federalization in Putin’s execution and variations on the theme of “decentralization” and “self-government reform” in the execution of our bureaucrats will ultimately only exacerbate the problem. It seems to me that from “our” side, an independent proposal should follow, since weakening the bureaucratic monopoly benefits everyone except bureaucrats, regardless of region.
There can be many variants of such proposals. Actually, the purpose of this column is to point out one mandatory condition that must be contained in such a proposal—a condition without which changes will go not to the detriment, but to the benefit of bureaucrats. This condition can be formulated simply as “all authority—for your own money.” This means complete independence of “local” budgets, whatever is understood by the word “local.” Both bureaucrats in Kyiv and “local elites” in their current version are interested in budgets flowing into each other, in both directions—from the region to the center and from the center to the regions. On this they build their careers and modest savings. It is this blessed monetary flow that allows them to “demand something from Kyiv,” and Kyiv bureaucrats, in turn, to tell locals how to live. Real decentralization, whatever it is called, must be based on the principle of “authority for your own money”—everything else is, at best, imitation.