Well, What Next? Kakistocracy of the Transitional Period

Over three months in power, Viktor Yanukovych has managed to accomplish quite a bit, which gives reason to contemplate where all this might lead and how it might end.

So, Yanukovych’s record includes the following: constitutional changes and formation of a majority of “tushkas,” which led to the rapid formation of a government and appointment of “his own” governors. Additionally, the new authorities demonstrated serious foreign policy and economic activity, having managed to extend the lease term of the Russian base in Sevastopol, as well as to “seriously advance” the matter of merging our Naftogaz with Gazprom. The aircraft construction and uranium procurement ideas of the new leadership should also be counted here.

What conclusions and forecasts can be drawn from these, so to speak, data? What do Yanukovych and his people reveal to us?

The New

Despite the prevailing view of the “Donetsk people” as representatives of everything outdated and old, they demonstrate behavior that is new for Ukrainian politics. The novelty lies in the fact that the “Donetsk people” are not at odds with themselves. Until now, Ukrainian political practice consisted of officials fighting at windmills called “bureaucrats,” “oligarchs,” and the like. A classic example of such behavior is Leonid Kuchma, who, being president of the country, constantly complained about his officials and mercilessly criticized them, as though he had nothing to do with them.

Such behavior is so familiar that it causes no surprise. But the “Donetsk people” demonstrate something different. They try to present themselves as a unified team that has received power and intends to use it to the full.

There is one more telling novelty. Judging by the intensified activity of paid internet commentators, power is now considered a sacred category. The previously prevalent—though rather implicit—opinion that any power is bad is now considered heretical. Whether this viewpoint can be made mainstream remains unknown, but the efforts being expended in this direction are impressive. The “Donetsk people” try to present the matter such that unlimited authority to dispose of fellow citizens’ money and time under threat of force is some sacred and non-negotiable function. This function now sanctifies the activities of the “Donetsk people.” There is nothing special about them; they are simple guys like you and me, but they were “given a mission”—this is approximately what this “message” looks like.

The attempts to blame any criticism and dissatisfaction on “Yulia” are blowing into the same horn. That is, if you don’t like the authorities, then you are for Tymoshenko. A position is being formed: power is from God, and we are only given the choice between yuls and yanyks. What the authorities do and why they are needed at all—these questions are carefully placed outside the brackets.

What Are We Dealing With?

Pay attention to the nature of the most prominent initiatives of the new authorities. Personally, I cannot shake the feeling that these initiatives are from Kuchma’s 1994 program. The approaches are approximately as follows. One needs to “befriend” Russia. One needs to solve corporations’ problems by providing them benefits. The larger the corporation, the more important it is.

So, the following features of the “Donetsk people” politics can be distinguished:

• Corporatism. The world is seen as an arena of interaction of corporations and their associations. States are also corporations.

• Personalities, not institutions. A typical example is the gas agreements. The entire “problem” with gas could easily be solved by removing the state from its solution and any participation. The state’s role is legal protection of agents purchasing gas, nothing more. However, we see a different approach—some bosses make agreements with other bosses, “so that there is gas.”

• The end justifies the means. A typical example is the coalition of tushkas story.

• Efficiency is understood as formal elimination of the “heading” of a problem. For example, there was a problem with gas, Sevastopol, and relations with Russia. After signing the well-known agreements, everything remained as it was, except for the “heading.”

Generalizing, one can say this. The “Donetsk people” are Leonid Danylovych Kuchma, who suddenly took it into his head to take responsibility for power, begin executing his own program, and “establish order” as he understands it.

Motivation

Before discussing the prospects of the new authorities, we should say a few words about their motivation. I think I won’t be wrong in saying that the main stimulus is stability. Stability means guarantees of income for members of the ruling group and guarantees of privileges for their business. A consequence of the stability requirement is the idea of order. From the “chaos” which, by general opinion, has afflicted our country, everyone suffers without exception. Order is the manageability of officials. Under “order,” officials do what they are supposed to do, perfectly coordinating their efforts and not causing anyone trouble.

Kakistocracy

In order to at least approximately predict the future, one needs to overlay the political doctrine of the “Donetsk people” onto the actually existing social system.

This system can be characterized by the apt and sonorous Greek word “kakistocracy.” By analogy with aristocracy—that is, rule by the best—kakistocracy is rule by the worst. Kakistocracy is a social system generated by the everyday practice of Ukrainians. Since every Ukrainian considers all other Ukrainians to be scoundrels, with whom “there is no other way,” then as a result, he gets exactly what he wants—political-economic power consists of the worst Ukrainians, carefully selected through daily selection. Here it is important to understand that real social systems are products of everyday actions of many people, not their goals, intentions, or, all the more, declarations. That is, kakistocrats—people at the “top” of our society—are a product of our regular activity, of the criteria we follow when making simple everyday choices.

For our topic, the most important feature of Ukrainian kakistocracy is the priority role of status as a source of opportunities. The Ukrainian dream consists in becoming a boss. A boss is a person whose field of opportunities depends on his status. Obviously, one of the sources of status is a government position. So-called corruption is an inevitable consequence of this state of affairs.

Now it is easy to see that Yanukovych’s team in its current form is an extremely unstable transitional arrangement.

A Small Digression

Here we should note some circumstances specific to this team. These are, so to speak, non-systemic, personal circumstances. First, note the weakness of this team precisely as a team. The goals of stability and order are purely defensive. They cannot be a source of initiative and growth, cannot be team-forming at the state level.

Second, note the professional and practical weakness of the team. People who believe that raising taxes and strengthening state regulation is the answer to all questions at all times, to put it charitably, are somewhat behind the times.

Third, it is obvious that Yanukovych and his people acutely need a boss over themselves. They see such bosses as big boys from Moscow, Washington, or Brussels. Hierarchical thinking generates the desire to curry favor with the boss, which we have observed over three months. Therefore, the simple idea that the more you concede to a partner, the less you are needed by them does not occur to them. For the “Donetsk people,” it is a matter of a boss, not partnership. When it comes to Russia, those around Yanukovych categorically fail to grasp what Russia wants from Ukraine. The gas transportation system, Sevastopol, the customs union, a satellite state—all this is certainly good, but these are merely pleasant additions to the main goal. The main goal lies not in Russia’s foreign policy but in its domestic one, which is experiencing a serious crisis of genre. A democratic alternative in Ukraine is what the Russian authorities fear most. “You see, the khokhls couldn’t manage democracy.” And so Russian authoritarianism becomes, however unpleasant, an inevitable pattern rather than a convenient form of realizing private and group interests. By the way, Russia would have been much better served by an “orange” Tymoshenko as president—then the propaganda effect would have been much stronger. None of this is understood by those around Yanukovych, and therefore, they will make mistakes.

A Corporation for Distributing Expenditures. The Dictatorship

I think we can skip scenarios where the current authorities’ activity is crowned with success. The pitiful drivel about Singapore is refuted by the simple fact that besides Singapore, about a hundred more countries enjoy authoritarianism, but no reforms or prosperity follow. Authoritarianism and prosperity are more antonyms than synonyms.

So, as a result of overlaying the “Donetsk people” political doctrine onto Ukrainian reality, the following systemic problems can be seen.

The first problem is differences between corporations. The “Donetsk people” were united by the history of the 2004 elections, fears of persecution, and thirst for revenge. All these motives were exhausted after their victory this year. Worse, the notion of the state as a large corporation with a president-director at its head, adhered to by the “Donetsk people,” suffers from one radical flaw. Unlike an ordinary corporation, whose goal is generating income, the state is a corporation for distributing expenditures. That is, it is logically impossible for all pressure groups to be satisfied.

As paradoxical as it sounds, the “Donetsk people” could have protected their business much better by remaining outside the state, as one pressure group among others.

Combining individual goals within the framework of general state policy is possible only by creating a hierarchy among them. This means ordinary dictatorship—socialism, essentially. Thus, the first “stable” state toward which the current authorities objectively tend is a socialist redistributive dictatorship. I put the word “stable” in quotes because, of course, this state is also unstable, as it lacks incentives for entrepreneurial activity and wealth creation. But compared to the current arrangement, socialism can last much longer, and its limits are set only by how long citizens agree to tolerate their own impoverishment.

Corruption Forever. Kuchma’s Regime

The second systemic problem is kakistocracy. In the “Donetsk people” corporation today, the overwhelming majority are kakistocrats supporting the new authorities because of the status and opportunities it provides. Status and opportunities are absolutely incompatible with both the idea of stability and the idea of order. There cannot be order and “entrepreneurial freedom” for officials simultaneously. If the practice of kakistocracy prevails, today’s “Donetsk people” will revert to the familiar Kuchma regime.

Thus, there is no scenario in which the “Donetsk people” are preserved as a corporation fully controlling the state. Either this group will transition to dictatorship, which means a significant thinning of their ranks and a kind of internal civil war, or kakistocracy à la Kuchma will triumph, in which the “Donetsk people” will simply dissolve.¹

Stable states, and what will have to be sacrificed:

The first stable state is the “Kuchma regime.”

Stability is ensured by the presence of corruption, as well as the constant rotation of kakistocrats around the president and the constant replacement of some kakistocrats with others;

Corruption in this system is relatively accessible to all;

A super-idea is not needed.

Foreign policy is amorphous (equivectoriality).

Enemies are former kakistocrats who have become oppositionists.

The second stable state is the “dictatorship.”

Stability is ensured by repression and the closedness of the political system from the influence of the population;

Corruption is accessible only to the “own”;

A super-idea is necessary, as is a charismatic leader;

Foreign policy is clearly defined. Attachment to one power, or aggressive neutrality like communist Albania;

Enemies in the dictatorship are the population.

What will have to be sacrificed for the transition to the “Kuchma regime”:

Stability—there will be no more “Donetsk people.” There will be a competition of kakistocrats for proximity to the court.

Corruption—there will be no order of the type “I’m the boss—you’re an idiot,” for which the PR voter voted. The voter will be offended;

A super-idea—no sacrifices needed;

Foreign policy—no sacrifices needed;

Enemies—enemies constantly change, which is rather positive for the system as a whole.

What will have to be sacrificed for the transition to the dictatorship:

Stability—there will be no “Donetsk people” either. There will be “small Donetsk people” who will defeat all other Donetsk and non-Donetsk;

Corruption—due to the limited nature of corruption in the country, “class struggle” and terrorism will appear;

A super-idea—there is no charismatic leader or super-idea. Given the different political-cultural preferences of Ukrainians, imagining such an idea is difficult, especially in the execution of the Donetsk people;

Foreign policy—one will have to decide where to buy real estate, store money, and educate children;

Enemies—enemies may win.