Models and We

In general, my recipe for a basic assessment of any constitutional draft is simple, and can be applied by anyone capable of logical thinking. The most important thing is to determine whether the principle of electability (and accountability) of the government has been implemented in the draft. This fundamental principle has never been implemented even once in Ukraine. Note that we will be electing our president for the fifth time, a figure who neither forms the government nor heads it. The question is: why do we need these elections, and why do we need this position? Or let us recall that until 2006, we elected deputies who made us promises, but the government was “started” separately from these promises — on its own. Or consider another example that reveals the caliber of our constitutional innovators: the requirement that the government’s program be approved by the Verkhovna Rada. This norm appeared when we had majoritarian elections and there were no parties. It then served as some kind of accountability mechanism for the Cabinet. But now we have party programs, for which people vote in elections, and these same parties form the Cabinet. Why do we need a separate Cabinet program? Are we promising people one thing, and deputies another? On what basis should the voter evaluate the work of the Cabinet? I should note that the principle of electability of the government has not been implemented in any of the drafts I have reviewed. Apparently, this is not coincidental.1


  1. The Ukrainian authorities cannot copy “rationally functioning institutions” because they are unable to extract profit in such a situation. Western elites can do it, moreover, “rationally functioning institutions” allow them to extract more profit. ↩︎