The official political-economic doctrine endorsed by all modern states explains their existence as follows. There exist, it says, two kinds of goods—private and public. People produce private goods and purchase them for themselves in necessary quantities. A public good is distinguished by various remarkable characteristics. For our purposes, the crucial one is the “indivisibility of consumption” of a public good. That is, it can only be consumed collectively; it is impossible to allocate a specific share to each person or to purchase as much as you need, due to the very nature of such a good. This is precisely why, we are told, the state exists, and why taxation in the broad sense of the word exists—meaning the forcible seizure of a portion of citizens’ property in favor of the state, carried out through taxes, loans, and increases in the money supply (inflation). Since the consumption of a public good is indivisible, no one can increase or decrease it personally, and in order for the good to be produced, everyone is obligated to pay and no one should shirk, for that would be a crime against everyone else. The state keeps a sharp eye on this process, and this is the meaning of its existence.
This doctrine creates, if you’ll pardon the expression, a political discourse that is again identical for all countries without exception, differing only in local color. Those who came of age in the Soviet Union will understand me when I say that the essence of this discourse reduces to “not everything is yet good with us” and “there are still isolated shortcomings in the localities.” Since both the seizure of citizens’ property and the production of “public goods” and their subsequent distribution always appear irrationally organized, and sometimes are accompanied by abuses—in some places simply flagrant—active citizens and progressive public opinion always have plenty to do.
In this column I do not intend to mock progressive public opinion, nor do I wish to be ironic about it. I simply want to draw the attention of those who share the doctrine and labor in the field of discourse to a detail that somehow cannot be found within this very discourse. This concerns a conclusion that follows directly from the initial premise about the indivisibility of a public good. It consists of this: if consumption is indivisible, then payment for such a good should be equal for everyone, for it is impossible to determine how much each person consumes. Therefore, all the numerous reforms that public opinion dreams about should logically reduce to a single per capita tax. All other types and forms of taxes, as well as loans and inflation, contradict the initial thesis that the state is a means of producing public goods. Let me explain.
In the case of a per capita tax, the state appears as a kind of provider of a public good—that is, it exists so that this good can be created. The logic here runs as follows: “We need this much public good in total. Therefore, each person owes this much.” With indirect taxes, loans, and inflation, however, the logic is reversed. The state first collects money—however much it wants—and then produces however much it can (and if it can). Here it turns out that public goods exist so that the state can exist (as, generally speaking, is indeed the case in reality). However, these are details. I repeat—I am reasoning within certain assumptions that govern mainstream political discourse, and I am not questioning the legitimacy of the obligation to pay taxes, the legality of collective decisions, or the possibility of universal mechanisms for making such decisions. Let us assume all of this is given. And let us focus solely and exclusively on the thesis of the indivisibility of a public good, on the conclusion that follows from it about a single and only tax for everyone, and on the question of why we do not encounter this conclusion in this discourse.
I think the reason is that in reality the thesis of “indivisibility” exists only as some sort of scholarly-sounding “justification,” while politicians and public opinion are in reality guided by completely different theses. My experience discussing this topic shows that as soon as the question of an equal share for each person is raised, a response immediately arises—how can it be that the rich should pay more! Under this, a “basis” is even constructed in the form of reasoning that the rich, it is said, have more to lose in the absence of “public goods.” But if the good is indivisible, the rich owe nothing. They may voluntarily pay more out of compassion for their lesser brothers. But they owe nothing specifically because of the initial thesis on indivisibility.
In general, dear workers of discourse! As soon as you begin to say that someone “needs” your public good more, and that someone will get more of it and someone less, you begin to divide. That is, the indivisible becomes divisible. And consequently, the entire concept of indivisible goods, and the taxation required for their production, and the state itself—all of it falls apart. What remains is only the self-evident idea of taking and dividing. Whether with malicious intent or out of ignorance, it does not matter, in principle.