When the author of these lines served in the country’s air defense troops, one soldier fell off a pull-up bar and killed himself outright. The commander-in-chief, in order to stop further damage to his pull-up bar statistics, ordered all those damn pull-up bars sawed down forthwith and to hell with them.
Something similar always happens when a certain hierarchy is tasked with caring for its charges. A recent example is the story of those grilled chickens that poisoned several dozen Kiev residents.
So, what is the state doing now? Sawing down pull-up bars. We are being told about organizing inspections at public catering establishments, that repressive decisions which, it turns out, had long been adopted will finally be enforced, and, of course, under this pretense, they will once again liquidate the MAFs that the state so hates.
It is clear that the state’s actions are inadequate and ineffective. But the question arises—can unpleasant (and often tragic) cases like “food poisoning” be avoided, and how?
First, let us determine exactly what problem we are dealing with. Can a system be created in which it is fundamentally impossible to be poisoned by “food products”? Obviously not. Therefore, we can only speak of minimizing risks. In our case, consumer risks are minimized when producers follow certain rules that can be called sanitary standards.
Today, the state is the sole producer of these “sanitary standards” and also their controller. Let us set aside the corruption component, which only gets in the way and distorts the picture, and simply think—can the state in principle handle this task? The whole problem is that for us and for the state, “fulfilling sanitary standards” are different tasks. The state needs “good” reporting, and if reporting worsens, it runs to saw down pull-up bars. What we need is for producers to follow rules that will help minimize our risks. Does reporting and sawing down pull-up bars help us in this sense? Obviously not.
Let us go further. What is a “sanitary standard” for a producer—in other words, is the state capable of creating standards that a producer would follow easily and voluntarily? The answer is obvious. If the officials’ work consisted of, say, preventing burns from hot water for those in their care, the first thing they would do would be to cut off their hands. “Good reporting,” as the main principle of any bureaucracy’s work, assumes that it is easiest to simply forbid everything, (well, okay, allow something), that in all disputed cases, the author of the rules is not to blame, but rather their executor—that is, the enterprise working in the market.
Therefore, various rules invented by the state for our “protection” are costs for the entrepreneur, which they will avoid whenever possible. What we need is for the entrepreneur to follow the rules, because our safety depends on it. How can this contradiction be resolved?
There is only one answer—we need to turn costs into competitive advantage. And for this, we need to kick the state out of this area.
The new system must be competitive and based on the goals of its participants. First of all, if we are talking about safety as risk minimization, it is clear that many degrees of these risks can exist. For example, chicken legs sold from a stall on the ground in the heat and the same chicken legs in a supermarket refrigerator under otherwise equal conditions carry different risks. Today’s system assumes they are identical and minimal, because the state “guarantees” us observance of the rules it itself has adopted. It is clear that the buyer still relies on their experience, but this experience can fail when choosing between two sellers with similar expected risks. For example, two identical-looking kiosks with similar products—which to choose? So, the main principle is the legalization of risk differentiation. The buyer must have information about what may threaten them.
This information the seller can provide voluntarily, and it will even be beneficial for them to do so. This is possible with a system of voluntarily assumed rules, or, say, standards. They can and should be completely different, from the simplest to the most complex, from including only conditions for storage and sale of products to the entire chain—from producer to consumer. Such standards are the property of their owners, say, some associations. A standard has its own mark, by which the buyer can easily identify it. For example, a yellow triangle on the display means the standard “I have a refrigerator.” The seller cannot guarantee anything else to the buyer, and the buyer can draw their own conclusions. Joining a standard is voluntary and includes procedures for choosing the standard’s owner. For some, a phone call will be sufficient; for others, an on-site inspection to verify compliance with its requirements.
It is clear that entrepreneurs will strive to have their business comply with the most popular standard. On the other hand, standards are not interested in having their requirements violated and will always react to buyer complaints. Therefore, entrepreneurs will not strive for standards whose fulfillment they cannot guarantee. On the third hand, standards are interested in advertising themselves. They will try to explain to consumers why following their rules is better than following a competitor’s rules; this information will not only be accessible but will also be forcibly imposed on the consumer by the standards, improving the consumer’s choice options. It is also clear that in the age of the internet, it is practically impossible to hide information. If you decide to buy something from a suspicious stall, it is better to pull out your phone and check the standard’s website to see if this stall is on their lists. It may immediately turn out that this stall was expelled from another standard a month ago, so it is better to refrain from purchasing.
Of course, this system cannot coexist with all sorts of sanitary-epidemiological stations and other state offices—it’s either one or the other. It is also clear that such a system must grow naturally, and initially it will consist of many narrow-specialty and regional (city, district) standards, and only after some time can national standards appear.