To discuss the prospects of the Ukrainian opposition in future elections, we first need to define what opposition actually is in Ukraine. The thing is that in this matter, democratic procedures and the rhetoric associated with them greatly distort reality. I think many people have a sense that outwardly democratic institutions look in our country like a saddle on a cow. The trouble is that since the conversation always revolves around the saddle (on which we allegedly will ride into a bright future), the cow beneath it falls out of sight. And when this animal suddenly does not perform the expected actions, or performs unexpected ones, everyone is terribly surprised, but persistently continues to debate about the saddle placed on the cow and what should now be done with it, what to improve, and so on.
About cows
So, about opposition. It seems that Ukrainians perceive opposition in terms of the feudal relations that dominate us and the picture of the world they generate. The opposition are those bosses to whom you can complain about life and who, with a lucky combination of circumstances, can protect you from arbitrariness. People turn to the opposition when corruption fails, or when a victim of state aggression suddenly “takes a stand.” The existence of the opposition also creates the illusion that the power of officials over people is somehow limited.
Thus, the opposition is an integral, and very importantly, legitimate part of the political system.
Note how everyone, old and young alike, became worried when attempts were made to introduce open political procedures instead of the familiar feudal relations. This refers to the political reform and, above all, to the proportional electoral system. The people, in full unity with their “authorities,” rejected these attempts. What will you read now if you delve into the depths of the internet? What are the “people’s” thoughts on the ideal political system? Correct, the “majoritarian system” and “the right of recall”! People consider it paramount to have their “right” to touch the deputy and argue with him at meetings with voters. The deputy must be “one of ours,” there must be an opportunity to complain to him. Well, and if he contemplates something bad—he can also be recalled. This naive archaic completely reflects people’s ideas about the ideal political model, a model that is feudal from beginning to end. The role of the opposition in this system simply expands the choice options. If the deputy turns out to be bad, you can complain to the opposition.
About saddles
Note that the “rights of power,” its authority, and organization never worried Ukrainians and, consequently, never worried politicians. It is believed that power should have rights, and preferably more of them, as this will allow it to solve problems better. All politicians without exception, who at the time of elections did not embody power, went with the same slogan in all elections without exception: “I’ll show them all!” Actually, this “showing” translates into demands for even greater authority to “maintain order,” that is, to be able to “solve problems” and effectively punish those who do not wish to do so.
The hysteria staged by the “progressive public” regarding Tymoshenko’s arrest is very telling in this sense. I think if instead of Tymoshenko it were some monster and cannibal who regularly ate his associates and drank the blood of Christian babies with their flesh, the public would still be concerned about the usurpation of power.
And what’s interesting. In fact, contrary to public choice theory, these people act rationally. The fact that it would be exactly the same—if not worse—in case of Tymoshenko’s victory does not interest them at all. They are interested in the existence of feedback channels, social institutions that have so far allowed them to achieve their goals. That is, in their understanding, the state should be exactly like this—totally oppressive, omnipotent, and merciless, and therefore, institutions that allow protection from oppression, so to speak, on a personal basis, are extremely important. The opposition is one such institution.
About cows under saddles
Now even political scientists are mumbling something about “society needing a new agenda” and that “the opposition will get chances when it puts forward new ideas.” I think this is precisely the case when the saddle prevents seeing the cow.
It is not difficult to see that, within the framework of the model described above, growing and cherishing politicians offering new content is simply meaningless. This is irrational. From the voters’ side, the demand is precisely for problem-solvers, and they must be inside the system, be part of it, otherwise they’re practically useless. As they say, a tit in hand is better than a crane in the sky.
The problem our people are experiencing now is, as usual, having to make a choice. The tit is about to die, and the crane is still out of reach. What to do?
People need some understandable rules to live by. The opposition integrated into the system is one of these rules. However, people cannot help but see that the rules are flawed. Their lives, in most cases, are getting worse, and this makes them cling to the rules even more strongly, while on the other hand, sharpens the understanding of the rules’ flawedness. This process resembles drug addiction and attempts to “get clean.”
By the way, “oppositionists” cause such hatred because they are “different”—they dare not accept the rules of the game. Oppositionists have already “gotten clean.” Therefore, their behavior and their very existence cause fear, fear of choice, fear that one will also have to “quit,” fear of an even more uncertain future. Fear breeds aggression, which we observe. From the “anti-oppositionists” we hear an aggressive stream of words devoid of any meaning and logic.
Are we going?
Our elections are not coincidentally always held in an atmosphere of exacerbation of marasmus and hatred for each other. The thing is that the very procedure of electing political power does not correspond to the feudal nature of society. After all, if we greatly simplify, we can say that those in power solve problems, and those in opposition also solve problems. Why should one choose at all and give someone preference? The election procedure cannot be applied to the problems that exist in society, but there are elections, and therefore one must somehow use them… In general, it’s a difficult case. I’ll say something strange, but the current unspoken public ideal may be that there would be no more stupid elections, but that there would still be an opposition.
It is difficult to say what will happen in people’s minds before the elections. However, whatever changes occur, it does not yet seem they will have a serious impact on the course and results of the elections. The would-be participants in the electoral race are again going under the slogan: “I’ll show them all!” Civil activists, on whom hopes were placed, are now putting forward their slogan: “I would show them even more if I were allowed to participate in the elections!” In general, it is clear that they are offering us the same old game, and those who do not want to play it, and those capable of offering something new, will no longer be able to become subjects of the campaign if only due to lack of time.
It is also clear that the opposition cannot win elections by definition. The unification of the opposition, which has been discussed since 1991, is an absolutely meaningless endeavor. This very question comes from the feudal world, in which the opposition’s only function is its current oppositional posture, not the prospects it may bring in case of its victory. That is, it is clear that it is good and convenient when the entire opposition is in one and the same place and there is no need to run back and forth. “Why not organize this right away?” ask the supporters of opposition unification.
It seems to me that important events may happen not before, not during, but after the elections. These events are connected with three circumstances. The first is another violation of the social contract by the Donetsk people. We said that the systemic opposition is part of this contract, one of the foundations of the system’s legitimacy. If it becomes clear to everyone that the opposition no longer brings any benefit, the legitimacy of the regime will fall even lower. All this will happen against the backdrop of processes caused by the second circumstance, namely, the triumphant victory of the Party of Regions, for which no one voted. The coincidence of these two events may lead to unpredictable consequences. And here, when these unpredictable consequences begin to develop, the third moment will come into effect. It is connected with the fact that after the 2012 elections, the “Donetsk people” may have complete control over the country’s political system. And here it will finally become obvious that this gives nothing. There is still no peace and stability. And they cannot have a dictatorship, because a real dictatorship is based only on love. The dictator must fight for justice, proclaim some ideas, and people must love him and be ready to die for him. But this—what is it?
Therefore, the “gravedigger” of Donetsk power will not be the current status-quo opposition, but those people who are currently inside this power, those who first understand that this ship is beginning to sink seriously.