---
title: "Coalitions, Not Parties"
slug: koalitsii-a-ne-partii
tags:
- "Plan 'B'"
- "Plan 'B' for Ukrainians"
weight: 345
---
The Plan 'B' I propose is significantly simpler and more accessible.
To begin with, setting aside parties and politicians entirely, the politically active population needs to shift toward operating as voter coalitions.
That is, instead of trying to unite around several issues 'a, b, c', unite around just one demand—say, 'a'. In such a coalition, you can have both those for whom 'a' is a high priority and those who consider it less important but still useful. Thus, we turn the same feature of 'public choice' that currently works against us to our advantage.
For example, suppose a law simplifying weapons regulation needs to be passed. This requires drafting the law, building a voter pressure group, and finding or electing people in parliament willing to vote for it. In this situation, the law's support group might bring together, say, Freedom party supporters and libertarians who would never unite under any other circumstances.
The basic principles coalitions should follow can be stated as follows:
1. Coalitions must be organized around a single goal. There can be no coalitions 'for all good things'—they will be ineffective and will discredit the entire movement. Let us recall that a favorite technique of bureaucracy since Komsomol days is goal dilution: efforts directed at 'c' get watered down by the bureaucracy with objectives 'a, b, d', thereby weakening the push and sowing discord. A classic example is the Tax Maidan, which they tried to stuff with Yanukovych's resignation and 'social demands'. The coalition must have only one goal.
2. The coalition's goal is passage of a specific law by the Rada. This is also crucial. Not 'saving the ecology of Stink Creek', but a concrete document. If saving the ecology requires several documents, then there should be several coalitions. They may be formally or informally united, but each must have one goal, and that goal must be a document.
3. The coalition itself must draft the law and insist on adoption of its own version only.
A coalition's work is lobbying. The coalition mobilizes supporters, handles PR, and works on finding and properly managing politicians for the decision.
It is very important that the coalition system exists outside the formal political process, entirely within civil society. It does not need state sanctions or regulation, and is not a component of the political system. Of course, various coalitions will be used for political purposes, but this does not matter, since the desired 'socially important' result comes not from the successes of any single 'correct' coalition, but from the functioning of this system as a whole. I also assume it goes without saying that coalitions can be formed around any laws, even those completely contradictory in content.
I would propose a model along these lines. Voter coalitions could operate through a common portal that provides necessary tools—for example, templates that prevent the creation of pseudo-coalitions 'for all good things'. Such a portal would create a cumulative effect by popularizing the movement as a whole and establishing certain standards. Since the movement is built around an instrument rather than a shared goal, such a portal would make it easier to keep out the swindlers who are sure to appear. Moreover, the internet allows creating institutions that are difficult to implement otherwise. For instance, it would be very valuable to secure a personal commitment from a candidate for deputy—or an incumbent deputy—to vote for the coalition's law.
Coalitions could begin working with potential candidates long before elections. These candidates must pledge to vote for the coalition's law, with the promise recorded on video and posted by the coalition (not by the candidate, of course) on YouTube. As I understand the trajectory of reputation system development, blockchain will soon play a significant role here, and reputation integration will become one of humanity's major concerns. Tie the deputy to blockchain, and he will never be able to wriggle out of what he said.
This kind of promise differs from the usual promises candidates make in that it is specific. Coalitions have no interest in party affiliation, political views, or the candidate's track record. He is only required to press the button at the right moment—and that action is the sole subject of the promise. Political promises given during elections, even when they appear specific, always exist within some context. Reputation does factor in, of course, but in general it is shaped by all events related to the politician, which allows him to easily ignore his own commitments. Furthermore, promises always take the form of a list 'a, b, c', which also gives politicians room to maneuver. In our case, he is required to say: 'I undertake to vote for the bill proposed by such-and-such coalition'—the most concrete action possible, regarding which it is always verifiable whether it happened or not.
In our case, the promise is made outside the context of political struggle, ideology, or the actions of supporters and opponents. There is simply a promise to do this or that, and the fact of its fulfillment or non-fulfillment—which makes it possible to designate the deputy as a positive or negative figure.
Such a system can benefit young, hot-headed, and ambitious deputies who gain the opportunity to include some 'a'—the passage of which the coalition is pursuing—in their own (or their party's) list 'a, b, c'. As a candidate, such a politician wins because a significant portion of the campaigning falls on the coalition's shoulders. Moreover, the coalition conducts this work independently of elections, and if the coalition's issue is sufficiently publicized, the politician increases his chances.
We should also note that the coalition system can work to repeal existing laws, not only to pass new ones—in other words, it becomes a form of defense against the existing political machine. This relates to the fact that the more points a particular decision includes, the harder it is to gather a significant number of supporters for it. The more logical branching points, the more possible variants, and the harder it becomes to reach agreement.
Coalitions Parties
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Creation Free State registration required
Reason for emergence Passage of a specific law Obtaining power, implementing a program, uniting around a leader
Goal Majority of votes for the coalition's draft Obtaining power (winning elections)
Program A concrete result needed by specific people 'What I would do if I were the state'
After achieving the goal Disbanded (is a situational association) Seeks reasons to continue existing (is an organization and a legal entity)
State control Not critical—the state cannot control all coalitions because their creation is free Are part of the political machinery
Laws of existence Unknown 'Iron law of oligarchy'
Note that I am not proposing to abolish parties or replace them with coalitions—let them do what they want. Coalitions are a tool of society, not part of the political machine; they can work with deputies, candidates, and parties, but they are not part of any of this.