Today there are four groups of expectations associated with the end of the state. The first, most popular one — reforms, that is, the party, coming to power, abolition of the state. The second — shadow economy, agorism, comrade Konkin. The third — catastrophic. Nothing can influence the state; one must wait until it collapses under its own weight. The fourth group — technological hopes. Indeed, new technologies are aimed at autonomy and independence, and since technological progress is dictated by demand and does not exist in a vacuum “by itself,” this says a great deal. As usual, the market shows what people’s real preferences are, not their blah-blah-blah.
Plan “B” is an alternative to Plan “A.” In the case of creating the instrument “coalition + 2 years to the Rada,” the idea of “joining the orcs’ army to change it from within” will suffer first. This idea is one of the foundations of state legitimacy; it channels the energy of people dissatisfied with what is happening into a direction that is safe for the system. I want to emphasize again that no revolutions, civil and other wars pose a danger to the state, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, they contribute to its strengthening. No costs and sacrifices among the population, including among the “elite” (up to its practically complete destruction, as has happened more than once in history), change the picture, since the method (taxation in the broad sense of the word) and the public that receives income from the use of this method are always preserved.
It doesn’t matter what laws progressive public opinion will adopt if it masters Plan “B.” The most important result is the very practice of making decisions without integration into the political machine. Since no “holistic concept” is actually possible, the “spontaneity” of such lawmaking is irrelevant. Nowhere and at no time was state policy the result of consistent execution of some comprehensive, holistic detailed plan; it has always been a spontaneous process.
Plan “B” can help protect the “shadow” economy and new technologies from state influence. Plan “B” will also allow creating tools and, possibly, practices alternative to the state, which will be very useful if (when) the state collapses under its own weight. This will help solve the eternal problem — people who find themselves under a burst state create the state again (initially of a smaller size) simply because they are not aware of any other alternatives and at this moment no other tools exist.
For the state to disappear from our lives, three groups of tasks must be addressed. First, protection from state influence; second, changing its “assembly points,” that is, its ability to expand; third — creating alternatives to “state functions,” making it unnecessary. Plan “B” addresses all these tasks in relation to all expectation groups.
Let us consider what the tasks of “protection,” “changing the assembly point,” and “making unnecessary” may include. At the same time, when we speak below about changes to the state’s structure, it should be understood that the tool “2 years to the Rada + coalition” is being used.
1. Protection Task
It is clear that it is often quite difficult to determine which function a particular measure fulfills to a greater extent — protective or “changing the assembly point”; as a rule, if a measure is aimed at reducing the state, it fulfills all these functions to a certain extent. It is also clear that such measures can be heterogeneous — from specific decisions to “directions” that should (or should not) be developed into one or several decisions. Of course, in the second case I will only indicate the direction.
1.1. Protection Instrument.
The coalition system is already a ready-made rapid response tool. A coalition to cancel some stupid law can emerge faster than the law will be adopted. For this reason, I do not consider specific regulatory acts here; there are too many of them, but the principle is one — we cancel.
1.2. Common Law.
Of course, I by no means claim a “transition” to common law; this is impossible. In this case, I simply want to point out the features of common law compared to continental administrative law practice. These features are realized “by themselves” in the case of private courts and private legislation (the British system was recently close to such a state), but until this exists, perhaps some solutions within continental law can be found.
We live in a place where officials and the state are separated from people not only by privileges and status, but also by the legal system. Our legal system is continental law, an important part of which is administrative law (regardless of whether lawyers distinguish it as a “branch” in this specific country). Now, administrative law proceeds from the presumption of the usefulness of the official’s and state’s activities. An official is guilty of something only when he violated some instruction or “law”; in all other cases, he has de facto immunity.
Unlike administrative law, common law ignores the presumed usefulness of the official’s activities; it punishes him regardless of whether his action was prescribed by law or instruction or was a violation of those laws. If there is a victim of his actions, there is a claim from him, the official will be held liable if the court establishes that the plaintiff suffered from his actions.
Such a system solves an enormous number of problems. The continental tradition assumes that one can protect oneself from the state through the same prescriptions to the same state, which will punish itself for their violation. This idea is embodied in the idea of a constitution and some “rights” that the state supposedly cannot violate.
As we can see, the method of “protecting oneself from arbitrariness through positive decisions” is unsuccessful, and not only in countries like Ukraine, where attempts are not even made to rely on “rights guaranteed by the constitution,” but also in “developed” countries. As we can see, it is completely meaningless, for example, to write about the inviolability of the home in constitutions. In common law, this is also unnecessary; if police break into your home for no reason, the police officer will be punished without any constitutions. Likewise, any kidnapping will be considered kidnapping, regardless of whether it was committed by a group of racketeers or a group of militia officers. You can sue doctors or officials who prohibit painkillers under the guise of “fighting narcotics,” since they are actually engaged in torture. Generally speaking, “crimes without a victim” are difficult in a common law system. Legalized fraud, such as government loans, is also hard to sustain, since they are made in your name (you will pay on them) without your consent or knowledge. And so on.
Let us also note that in common law there are no special restrictions on what a judge “can” or “cannot” do. Such restrictions are established by practice and constantly revised by it. I am addressing the concerns that many readers have about “judges canceling all laws.” For my part, I have opposite concerns — that they will be too afraid to cancel them. But, I repeat, the important thing is not this, but that in such a mechanism there are no final norms, and the court must make a decision in each individual case.
Administrative law is a cudgel with which one official should, for some reason, beat another official. Common law puts this cudgel into the hands of everyone; this is its radical advantage.
1.3. Personalization of the State.
It would also be logical to move away from the tradition of depersonalization of the state, which goes back to Roman law. The de facto state of affairs that we encounter in real life is the interaction of subjects. When we deal with the “state,” in reality we are dealing with private individuals acting in their own interests on behalf of a fiction of the state that does not exist in nature. It is clear that these interests do not necessarily consist of receiving bribes or kickbacks; in most cases, it is “good reporting,” career advancement, or (the most terrible and destructive option) the implementation of certain ideas aimed at the benefit of mankind. In any case, the official acts as if not himself, but on behalf of some magical entities.
This problem can be solved quite easily technically by not recognizing the legitimacy of anonymous and collective (on behalf of the “governing body”) orders. All orders, from “laws” adopted by the Rada to orders of some “rayon” office, must have an author, and if there is no such author, then no one is obligated to execute them. In the case of a system close to common law, this author (authors) will be the defendant in court if his decisions cause damage to someone. Progressive public opinion has long been discussing projects for “official accountability.” Of course, they are discussed in the paradigm of the “benefit” that some spherical-in-a-vacuum state brings. Therefore, proposals are based on measurements of this benefit (GDP growth or percentage of fat in butter) and punishment if the measured benefit turns out to be less than what progressive public opinion considers necessary. Such mechanics look obviously idiotic, and this embarrasses the public. Officials can come within reach of the public only if, to put it mildly, we set aside the paradigm of benefit and adopt the doctrine of common law, before which everyone is equal regardless of the benefit attributed to them by anyone.
1.4. “Treating” the Constitution. “Right to weapons, self-defense,” and the like.
Of course, I do not believe that one can change certain orders through the constitution, but they can be “fixed” in it for some time if there are already bearers of these orders who are ready to defend them. If for some reason it becomes possible to implement something like common law, this obviously makes the constitution unnecessary, since it is a product of an entirely different idea. In reality, however, we are in a situation of constant choice from alternatives and using opportunities that open before us. Therefore, there are no “holistic and consistent” political systems and even no “holistic and consistent” constitutions, and to avoid wasting effort, one does not even need to set such a task for oneself. Of course, if opportunities arise, the amendments I will mention below should be adopted, but in this case, I am rather using the example of the constitution to show what changes would be desirable so that we are protected from the state for some time.
The main purpose of the constitution is to serve as a limiter for state expansion. This specific limiter works exclusively through the judicial system; everything else (including the function of the president-“guarantor”) is nothing more than good intentions.
For such a system to work, several fundamental changes need to be made, aimed at making the constitution have direct effect (that is, be easily and simply accepted by courts as a source of law).
First, remove all references to laws from the text.
Second, remove the entire section on “rights” of citizens; it is not just superfluous but also contains “positive” rights that make direct effect of the constitution impossible.
Third, introduce the principle of judicial review into the constitution, that is, the possibility of any court stating that the law it is applying does not conform to the constitution within the framework of the case under consideration.
Fourth, eliminate the constitutional court.
The part of the constitution that speaks of rights can be replaced with these three articles:
“Every human being from birth possesses and disposes of their body and other property acquired peacefully. This right is natural; it is not established by laws or other prescriptions. Encroachment on property is an unlawful act. Everyone has the right to repel such encroachments in any manner available to them. Everyone has the right to defend themselves, their loved ones, and relatives. Everyone who has not been recognized by court order as legally incapacitated has the right to possess and carry weapons.”
“Everyone has the right to freely enter into contracts with other persons and institutions and to determine an arbiter in matters of the contract. Everyone has the right to apply to the arbiter specified in the contract or to a state court, if this is provided by the terms of the contract, in case of suspicion of non-compliance of the counterparty’s actions with the terms of the contract.”
“Any activity based on the voluntary consent of persons is legal and does not require any coercive regulation from outside.”
In principle, these articles contain all other “rights.”
Add to article 6:
“State officials act on behalf of the state. Any orders and acts of officials — laws of the Verkhovna Rada, orders, instructions, and any other forms of orders regardless of the method of their adoption, must be signed by their author (authors), or by the head of the relevant department. The lawfulness of anonymous acts and acts “on behalf of” an institution is not recognized; no one is obligated to execute such acts. Persons who sign state acts are responsible for their consequences.”
Of course, all articles concerning the NBU, NSDC, and other strange state agents should be removed from the constitution, as well as articles on administrative-territorial structure and local self-government.
Articles on the president should be abolished. Parliamentary republic.
The articles on the Cabinet should state:
“The Cabinet of Ministers is the highest body of executive power. Executive power is headed by the Prime Minister.”
In the articles on the Rada, it should be stated:
“The term of office of the Verkhovna Rada is 2 years.”
And naturally:
“The right of legislative initiative belongs to a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada.”
No more Cabinets and other housewives’ associations as subjects of legislative initiative.
The following two articles can limit the activity of the “gone-mad printer.”
“All laws adopted by the Rada have a term of effect; a law without a term of effect is not valid. The term of effect is established by the Rada from one to five years and is indicated in the text of the law. After the expiration of the term, the law is automatically canceled if the Rada has not extended its term by a simple majority of votes. Laws adopted by the Rada before this amendment entered into force are considered to have a term of effect of one year.”
“Laws are adopted by a majority of 226 votes. To cancel a law, 100 votes are required.”
Regarding the last one, I will say that “cancellation of a law” requires the same mobilization of votes as its adoption. If 226 voted “for,” this does not at all mean that 224 voted “against,” that is, if someone thought that any law after the adoption of such an amendment would be automatically canceled, they were very deeply mistaken.
2. Changing the “Assembly Point”
The state is not neutral. It is not a tool that can be used in one’s own interests; it is a group of people receiving income from organized coercion. Through elections and coups, one can only formally head this group and even partially fill it with one’s own people. But the motivation and the corresponding direction of coordination of their efforts will not change from this. Officials, members of their families, businesses connected with them, and people hoping to profit at someone else’s expense have identical incentives for state power to grow, and it is precisely these incentives that determine their actions.
Therefore, “changing the assembly point” means placing the state in conditions that would resist the incentives for growth. Only the victims of the state can realistically resist its expansion. The state understands this and therefore does everything to make the robbery of victims as imperceptible as possible for them; it expands the assortment of methods of robbery (taxes, tariffs, inflation, loans), tries to make robbery legitimate (social functions of the state, pensions, etc.), arranges a political circus for the public, and encourages them in every way to believe that “these bad ones are here, but the next ones can be better.” Let us note that elections change barely a hundredth of a percent of those who actually receive income from organized coercion, but the strength of the show is such that no one even pays attention to this (the hypertrophied bias of the population toward deputies, who constitute the smallest and most harmless part of the “ruling class,” is quite indicative here; the reason for this bias is obviously that deputies are shown on television).
Accordingly, the “assembly point” will change only if the broad public returns to reality from the world of wet fantasies about how best to divide the oligarchs’ money.
Below we will talk about how to do this. I remind you that we are not talking about some ready-made form (although it looks like some “Republic 2.0”), which should be “adopted” or “implemented”; we are talking about the direction of movement. As they say, the main thing is not where we stand, but where we are heading.
2.1. Money and Chairs.
In the current system, the state will get its share regardless of what happens; taxes and inflation work constantly. While you are busy discussing “political struggle,” you are being diligently robbed. The first and most important way to bring the public back to reality is a direct link between taxation and elections. The voter votes for the taxes they will pay. This is quite easy to do if other conditions are met.
2.2. Anesthesia.
This means there should be no tax anesthesia. Taxes should be paid only by individuals; such a tax should be one (or be a “composite” tax, which we will discuss below), and it should be paid not as some percentage, but as your share in the future budget. The essence of a tax reform that can change something consists not in changing tax rates and the number of taxes, but in placing the state budget in complete dependence on the taxpayer’s desire to pay. There should be no taxes that “automatically” fill the budget. Only voters can fill the budget, bringing their share in their little beaks.
2.3. Finances.
Obviously, in such a system the state should have no sources of income other than taxes. Tariffs, excise taxes, customs duties, fines, as well as loans — all of this should be abolished. There also cannot be any “paid services” of the state; all these shops should be destroyed, and all “services” should be paid for from the budget. It is clear that there should be no inflation — the central bank should be abolished, the monetary system should be in the form of a currency board or free circulation of any currency with a currency announced in advance in which taxes will be collected.
2.4. Confusion.
It is clear that only those who pay taxes have the right to vote. Those who receive from the budget, including officials, military personnel of the state army, etc., should not vote and should not pay taxes. Technically, this is easy to implement. Payment of taxes automatically registers you as a voter. Appearing on the lists of budget recipients (that is, taking a job in state structures or receiving assistance from the state) automatically excludes from the lists of taxpayers and voters. Blockchain is our helper, and let’s go.
For the completeness of such a system, the constitution should include a complete list of state agents, each of whom is a recipient of their share of the tax. Reducing this list can be done by a simple majority; increasing it — by constitutional (or altogether prohibited). That is, in the end we will get 5-6 ministries, each of which is a recipient of its share, and the tax will have a “composite” form. For example, a tax of 3,000 hryvnias per year, of which defense — 1,000 hryvnias, state court — 1,000 hryvnias, officials’ expenses — 500 hryvnias, support for the disabled and poor — 500 hryvnias. After the next elections, the total tax amount may not change, but the winning party may redistribute them anew. In general, politicians and the public get a new exciting hobby — how to better redistribute limited resources, that is, they find themselves in a role so familiar from their usual daily lives. The myths and legends they follow today as voters move to the background, and some even disappear. It is clear that expansion of functions will be attempted within the framework of existing ministries (for example, the defense ministry may try to transfer disability benefits from the ministry of the sick to its department), but, in general, such expansion can only be carried out at the expense of the appetites of other departments.
2.5. Reducing Appetites.
By the way, about appetites. If we consider that a serious reason for state expansion is always the flow of money from the region and into the region (and the proper development of these funds constitutes the essence of local politics), then appetites, and therefore incentives, can be seriously reduced by “transferring power to localities.” Only this needs to be done in a certain way.
Let us imagine that the “social functions” that a person encounters in their life today are carried out by hromady. A “hromada” is an organization of citizens with individual membership, not based on residence in a certain territory. Many hromady can operate on the territory of the usual “administrative units,” easily crossing the “borders” of these formations, since hromady are formed on a functional, not territorial, basis. Hromady manage the current “municipal” infrastructure, “public” transport, roads, parks, etc. The form of such management is chosen by the hromada itself — from financing by contributions (in the case of, for example, a park) to semi-commercial structures (in the case of, for example, transport). Such a form is flexible enough; it will allow an easier transition to private management where it is obviously a more effective form of management.
Hromady are free to establish their own “governing bodies,” whose authority concerns only members of the hromada and the property it manages. Accordingly, they can enter into any agreements with each other, forming common “governing bodies” according to their own models within their own means.
In a city, there is no local government familiar to us, no “local budget” and “local taxes.” A city dweller participates in the activities of those hromady whose participation they consider necessary; financing occurs through contributions. Magistrates (for example, sheriffs) are also actually a form of hromada; their authority extends to members of the hromada and their property, and they are financed by them.
Each “populated locality” thus gets the opportunity to form its own flexible model of governance.
The constitution establishes the principle “everything not attributed by this constitution to the powers of the state remains with hromady and magistrates.” The constitution also states that “for interaction and better management of citizens’ property, citizens create hromady and endow them with powers that extend to their members and the property managed by the hromada.”
Thus, the state is completely separated from what we today might call “local self-government,” is in no way connected with it administratively, politically, or financially. Along with financial and power opportunities, incentives for expansion are reduced.
2.6. Political Circus.
Politically, the republic can be organized as a parliamentary-type republic, however, for the full realization of the principle “taxation is the result of the political process,” some “Swiss”-type changes should be made to the traditional model. The essence of the idea is that at each election, which takes place every two years, the voter votes for the future budget, and subsequent taxation is carried out against this budget. The voter, actually, votes for the amount of tax they will pay and for its distribution among purposes. Of course, various variants of implementation are possible here; I will offer mine. At elections, the government is formed by the party whose budget project receives a relative majority of voters’ votes. It forms the Cabinet, which cannot be dismissed during the term of parliament’s powers. Parliament is formed as usual, but the majority is no longer institutionalized. However, in fact, it is necessary. For example, if the party that formed the Cabinet links the adoption of certain laws to the budget, it will have to negotiate about this with other parties.
Taxes are paid immediately after elections and in the same amount a year later (if the budget is formed for a year).
Thus, we get a system in which the voter’s greed stands guard over their interests and hinders state expansion, which reduces its opportunities for robbing the voter and lowers the state’s ability to grow. It is clear that in such a model the economy feels wonderful.
Modern democracy is a system with positive feedback; voters who believe they are robbing others give more and more, and as a result, the system “accelerates” and self-destructs. A republic is a system with negative feedback; voters are interested in paying less; as a result, theoretically, the state can shrink to zero.
3. The Task of “Making Unnecessary”
As we said, the state can “shrink to zero,” but this will happen if commercial services develop in parallel on its field, the quality and diversity of which will obviously be higher. Generally speaking, it should be understood that even with the most scrupulous implementation of the “Republic 2.0” project, we will be able to protect ourselves from the state for 10-15 years. Actually, protective measures are measures that limit damage and allow better resistance to the state; measures for changing the assembly point allow weakening it and reducing its expansion, but by themselves they are not a guarantee of its “shrinking.” The state will definitely invent something that will allow it to expand again ever more uncontrollably. With these measures we can only win time, but they do not guarantee victory. Victory can only be achieved when people stop using the state out of uselessness.
3.1. Competition.
With the transition to a per capita tax and a fixed number of state services, the question of competition in this field arises by itself, since voting in elections will be oriented toward “optimization” and reducing your tax; more and more articles of state expenditure will be gradually expelled from it. In such an environment, speaking about competition with state services is much easier. Moreover, the state monopoly is actually not proclaimed openly. Sometimes it is introduced by laws, but often it is simply a de facto state of affairs. Therefore, no insurmountable obstacles exist for competing with the state on its field, especially when its expenditures are being reduced, in such a system.
3.2. Payment in Parts.
In the case of a “composite” per capita tax, when the total amount consists of known expenses for the budgets of specific departments, the possibility arises of refusing to pay for a specific department. For example, in your tax of 1,000 hryvnias, the expenses of some ministry of transport are 50 hryvnias, but since you do not use anything that this ministry does, you notify the state that you exclude it from your tax, and next year, if the total amount does not change, you pay 950 hryvnias. Or you refuse the services of the Ministry of Health. You do not pay the corresponding part of the tax, and the state “ambulance” no longer comes to you. In this list, refusing the services of state defense looks today like the last line, although the current war clearly shows the price of this service.
3.3. The Concept of Exiters.
The two previous circumstances make the implementation of the concept of exiters possible, on which we will dwell in more detail.
The idea is that a person can “leave” the state by refusing its “services” and ceasing to pay it taxes and bear other “obligations.” I have long noticed that statists discussing the “voluntary” nature of taxes immediately fall silent if they are offered to continue paying taxes as much as they want but to leave in peace those who do not want to do this. It is clear that statists think in categories of universal “laws.” They believe that libertarians want to come to power and abolish taxes, that is, this decision will apply to everyone without exception. In fact, this is not the case.
Those who want to pay taxes and obey the state’s orders can do so as much as they want. The problem to which this book is devoted is precisely that they want everyone else to do the same.
It is time to end this state of affairs; a person must have the opportunity to refuse slavery. Let us remember that the state actually exists only and exclusively in the mind. In the physical world, there are officials who receive income acting on behalf of the “abstract state,” while the “abstract state” itself is the beliefs of people, the consent to obey officials and the idea that “there is no other way.” Therefore, the only consistent and workable method is the “growing through” of society through the state. People who have understood the harm that the state causes to society must have the opportunity to openly refuse it. The spread of such practice is the main condition for the disappearance of the state. It must become unnecessary; its parasitic nature must be recognized. Doing this instantaneously for everyone is impossible.
“Exit” means that a person refuses the “services” of the state in exchange for refusing their “obligations” (taxes). Logically, both should exist in the form of some lists. The best option is a personal signature on the constitution as the basis of citizenship, and the withdrawal of this signature as exit from it. Actually, this would be the implementation of the “social contract,” the very one that statists so love to discuss.
Taxation existing only in the form of taxation of citizens, the absence of a monetary monopoly, and an exhaustive list of state functions fixed in the constitution greatly facilitate matters. The possibility arises of refusing each function separately.
However, even if all this is absent, and indirect taxes and inflation exist, “exit” can also be implemented. After all, it is impossible to calculate how much I “owe” and how much is owed to me. There should be a “right of exit” with clear and obvious consequences.
By the way, the main problem here is that since the Enlightenment, the state has identified itself with society, in many cases performing social functions that it has appropriated. Actually, your contribution to “society” in monetary form can be determined through your income without taxes (from an economic point of view, this is a larger amount than your net monetary income). This makes it obvious that what you give to other people does not in any way need the sanction and the very existence of the state. The state substitutes your contribution with taxes; it is precisely taxes that modern public opinion considers your contribution (although, of course, if we speak of “society as a whole,” a tax is an extraction, not a contribution). Moreover, where it is believed that you “take from society,” the state actually appears in the role of “society.” Within monetary relations, one can approximately say how much we give to society and how much we receive from society (at the current moment). By making a little effort, one can calculate how much we give to the state. But how much we receive from the state cannot be determined in monetary terms (of course, we receive nothing from the state; the impossibility of monetary expression is meant here to speak about the procedure of some bargain regarding redemption).
Therefore, there simply cannot be a “honest” and “fair” solution here; only a political solution is possible. The best option is the situation described here, but if the implementation of the “exiter” concept becomes possible under other initial conditions, it must be implemented. The idea of “exiters” is good also because it will constantly stir up the question: who, how much, where, to whom, and for what “contributes.” Getting rid of mythology and propaganda is very important here. And, most importantly — the decision “let’s pay for everything ourselves” comes by itself in this reasoning. Let’s take a classic example — roads. If I am an “exiter,” how do I use state monopoly roads? By rights, I should pay for them. And by the same rights, not “in general,” but when I use them. And the question immediately arises — why is this principle not applied to everything else?
“Exit” is not existence in a vacuum. The exiter is simply a full subject, the owner of themselves and their property. They build their relationship with the state as with the owner of the territory and the people who are non-exiters. Being an “exiter” does not mean, for example, that you can set up a stall and trade where others cannot. For this, you first need to buy the land from the state. However, on this land, all kinds of state regulations and other desires no longer apply. In reality, most likely, unspoken agreements between exiters and officials will operate on this matter. By the way, there is a very illustrative point here. “Exit” without property and ownership makes sense only as legal non-payment of taxes. If you do not have some territory, you will still have to obey state laws, since you are on the territory of another owner — the state. No one will allow you to run around and shoot stupid sheeple. The sheeple will appeal to the owner and you will be eliminated on quite legal grounds. This is a good example that property rights (including oneself) are the source of “laws” (in our case — orders to other people), and not the other way around. The state is the owner of the territory and issues orders on this territory. To have the opportunity to completely ignore it, you must have your own piece of territory. The state is not obligated to protect you anymore; if you are killed, it should not investigate this crime. But you can freely defend yourself and your property, enter into contracts for jurisdiction with private courts, and do everything that is written about in libertarian books.
In reality, if the idea of hromady is implemented, an “exiter” will differ from an ordinary person only in that they do not pay taxes to Kyiv and has somewhat strange habits in resolving legal problems. If local life is managed by voluntary public organizations and private companies, that is, services are paid for by the consumer, and part of property management is financed by voluntary contributions, then an “exiter” is not at all a hermit who has walled themselves off from the world, but quite the opposite — an activist public figure. Only officials in Kyiv lose from their “exit”; “local” life (and our life with you is only “local” life) loses nothing.
3.4. Civil Projects.
The civil projects discussed below solve three tasks.
First, they reduce costs for those already ready for horizontal interactions but lacking tools; second, they create practice; social institutions are the result of practice, not intentions. It is important that these tools exist not for “advanced libertarians,” but for all who wish, to the extent that they can use them to their benefit; third, they provide an alternative, an answer to the eternal question “what instead of the state?” These projects are not tied to any political changes; they can be started right now.
3.4.1. “Democracy 2.0”
Now that there is “Kickstarter” and other similar platforms, explaining what “Democracy 2.0” is has become much easier. “Democracy 2.0” is a crowdfunding platform for social projects. Anyone who wishes can try to raise money for their project within a certain time. If they fail, the money is returned to the investors. If they succeed, they implement the project, publish reports, and so on.
Thus, many projects can be financed — from building children’s playgrounds to building roads and military procurement.
Generally speaking, project activity is one of the best ways to show what an alternative to budget financing can look like in cases where “public consciousness” is not yet ready to perceive private companies in the state’s place. Currently, we observe Ukrainians regularly collecting money for various needs. Such a platform would help them greatly in this endeavor.
3.4.2. “Describe the State”
An interesting circumstance in the life of the state, of which very few people are aware, is the fact that no one knows exactly how it is organized. By “organization” I mean not formal descriptions of powers within some hierarchy, but real interconnections between functional elements. It is precisely they, and only they, that matter.
Let me give an example. Dicey quotes Blackstone, who writes: “We shall consider those branches of the royal prerogative which invest our sovereign with a multitude of personal powers and rights, the exercise of which constitutes the executive power of the state. By the British constitution this power is wisely committed to one hand for the sake of unity, strength, and dispatch. If this power were committed to many hands, they would depend on the will of many, and the will of many, if they do not agree and go different ways, creates weakness in government; to combine these differences of will and merge them into one is a matter requiring more time than the needs of the state can admit. The King of England is therefore the chief and even the sole magistrate of the nation, all others act by his command and in due subordination to him.” After the quote, Dicey maliciously remarks that even in Blackstone’s time, the king did not possess these powers, and that the last king about whom one could speak in Blackstone’s words was William the Conqueror.
The real system is formed by the interaction of acting subjects and never coincides with its formal description. This is well known, for example, to officers who have served in different units. The army is an ideal hierarchy with strict relations of subordination and responsibility, as described in the relevant regulations. Meanwhile, real orders in different units differ.
Let me also remind you of such a form of strike as “doing everything by the book.” Such a strike simply paralyzes the enterprise, since real management and real functions almost never correspond to their descriptions.
In the case of the state, there is another circumstance. The state is not unified. It is a set of coalitions of officials of varying degrees of rigidity, whose task is to obtain the budget, spend it, and exploit side opportunities (as we say — corrupt opportunities). These groups compete with each other and often enter into conflicts with each other.
As we have said, officials are like entrepreneurs; they are constantly engaged in the search for profit, searching for new “technologies” that would allow expanding their activities into new areas. This activity is not managed or regulated, and it is precisely it that constitutes the content of the process of state expansion. Discoveries of various “know-how” and “new technologies” occur constantly; different official groupings use different technologies at different times and in different places.
Now, very often these “new technologies” are used to the detriment of other groupings of officials. For example, some official enterprise discovered that certificate A, which it issues, is very well suited from a profit perspective for certificate B. This enterprise begins issuing certificate B as well. But certificate B is the ancestral prerogative of another respected enterprise. If it learns about this, a conflict will begin. This is, of course, a very simplified description of the situation, but the fact remains — describing the system, if not kills, then paralyzes the system. The main harm that the state does to us is concentrated not in the Verkhovna Rada, as everyone around is sure, but in the countless permitting and inspecting bodies. It is precisely here that state expansion occurs; it is these bodies, not politicians, that constitute its main mass. One of the ways to paralyze the activity of these figures is to describe their real functions and connections between them.
Imagine a website where anyone can, using ready templates, describe their encounter with this or that state office. For example, you needed certificate form A, you applied to office B and received it. On the site, you found office B (if it is not there — you added it), indicated known information about it (working hours, phone number) and indicated that at the office you received certificate A. If another person is looking for how to get certificate A, they will find office B through your description. If, for example, going to office B in their city, they discover that they are also required to provide certificate C, they will indicate this in their description. Similarly, relations of subordination and other elements of the system are described. Importantly, this is not done from one center; everyone brings their piece of information.
Thus, naturally, a description of the real system arises — a description that can always be corrected in accordance with new trends and discoveries in official business. And, as we have said, describing the system kills the system.
It is very important to understand here that the service such a website provides to people is the optimization of the search for bureaucratic solutions to their problems. From the data on it, they can learn where and how, and with what features, they can get something from officials. In no way should the activity of this site be connected with “fighting corruption,” “complaints to authorities,” and other “how long!” and “save us!” In this case, its activity is doomed, if only because official groupings themselves will use it to fight each other.
3.4.3. “Property Rights Guarantees”
I think many were surprised not to see “protection of property rights” as the first point of “Plan B.” The thing is that the “problem of protecting property rights” is not some local Ukrainian problem. It is not even a purely political problem, that is, one that could be “resolved” through the political process, by changing legislation, and similar things. Rather, one can say that this is a fundamental problem of the modern world, and the deeper you delve into its study, the deeper this conviction becomes.
I have long noticed that the more important a particular issue is, the more “neglected” it is, and property rights are one of the leaders here. I had to rewrite this section three times, as each time it turned out that too much was written. As a result, we will examine this issue in detail in the book about private laws. Here we will briefly outline some conclusions.
So, property rights are a phenomenon of activity. They arise immediately along with the I. I and not I, mine and not mine — here is the beginning and source of property rights. Property rights define who uses (possesses, disposes of) a certain resource at the moment, and also, if necessary, define how conflicts proceed. That is, using certain resources and entering into relations with other people regarding them, we use property rights for this. More precisely — what we do for this is property rights. They are not something homogeneous and always the same.
Example. Three families with many people, one TV and one remote. In the first family, the public has adapted so well to each other and understands each other’s needs that no one asks when they can use the remote and get their dose of television. In the second family, relations around the remote are built on situational agreements “can I have cartoons?” or “you know, there’s football now,” sometimes reaching the level of exchange “cartoons in exchange for washing dishes” and so on. In the third, things have gone so far that they have a schedule for using the remote and TV hanging on the wall. In all three cases, we are talking about using the “objectively the same” good in quite similar circumstances, but in each of them, their own version of property rights is implemented (let us not forget — property rights are a phenomenon of activity).
Now let us introduce the state into this. For example, a house committee. Let property rights be monopolistically established and regulated by the state. At least, registered. What is registered by the house committee is property rights; if not, then no. Let us immediately note that in the first two cases, the state is simply unable to establish anything; it does not distinguish property rights here, since they are unique and movable. But in the third case, a reproducible mechanism works — the schedule for access to the remote on the wall. The house committee establishes the “rules on the wall” as a sign of the existence of property rights and registers only rights of this kind, since it is able to control them. The first two families are forced to compose rules unnecessary to them, otherwise the state will punish them. The consequences and harm from this are, I think, obvious.
Let us complicate the situation. Now let the house committee write the rules on the wall for everyone in the building. That is, it is the owner of all remotes; it issues them by schedule to those to whom they are “due.” It is clear that members of the house committee do not go around apartments to watch television; each of them has their own TV. They decide how other people should use the remotes, monitor this, and punish. I think you have imagined what rich political life boils around all this. If we add reporting and career advancement for members of the house committee, our picture will be complete. And do you know what our two cases are called? The first, when the house committee registers rules, is called “private” property; the second — “state” or “public.” And so, it turns out (almost everyone is sure of this) that in our world, a fierce conflict is underway between these two “types of property”!
However, it is not difficult to notice that the conflict is embedded quite differently, namely, in the monopolistic right of the state to establish the existence or non-existence of property rights. Yes, of course, “private property is usually more efficient than state property,” but actually, this is simply a conflict of different degrees of intervention. Disputes within the dichotomy “private — state” are meaningless; you will always have to introduce additional entities to explain what is being discussed. After all, the Fed is a private office? And “Kyivenergo” is too. You always have to explain why they are “bad”; there must also be free entry into the market and other perks, and only then can private property be considered fully private. All this looks like some greenhouse conditions specially created by someone according to a script; conditions created for the triumph of some incomprehensible idea. All this blurs the subject of discussion, leads to false conclusions, and leads researchers into traps. Elinor Ostrom and Hernando de Soto are typical prisoners of such traps.
One should speak not of private and state property, but of the freedom to form property rights. The conflict causing abundant negative consequences exists between freely forming property rights and constant attempts of the state to control this process.
By the way, privatization in post-Soviet countries is a good illustration of the error of opposing “state — private.” As long as the state “permits” property, controls it, regulates the activities of economic entities, and so on, the effect of privatization is significantly less than it could be. One always has to say that our private property is “not real.” Then what is real? That which is formed freely and is completely regulated by the market, that is, by the activity of people.
Now let us look at Ukraine (or any other poor country). Here is the eternal question: “Why can’t they (that is, the authorities, oligarchs, etc.) come to an agreement? When will the redistribution of property stop?” It has a simple answer — never. There will be no agreement and the redistribution will not stop because in this game there is a “king of the hill” position, that is, the position of “being a state” or “having access to the state.” In a situation where the state determines what property is and what it is not, and who owns it and when, and moreover, resistance to the state is illegal, the position of “king of the hill” will never disappear. This is the very case about which statists say “violence is always beneficial.” In this case, it is true, since the resistance of the victim is reduced to zero (it is prohibited), there is no third party to which it could turn for help, and there is no arbitration, since the state is its own arbiter. Yes, in this case, robbing is indeed easier than earning.
Poverty, that is, short planning horizons, makes the position of “King of the Hill” valuable, and this position breeds new poverty. By the way, “rich” countries are those countries in which the position of king of the hill was historically (relatively) weak, and the dependence here is direct — the weaker, the better, up to Britain and the USA, where property rights were regulated by common law, not by the state. Even in German states before the victory of legal positivism, pushed by Prussian militarism, a kind of lawyers’ law operated. Property rights in countries like Ukraine will be “protected” to a greater extent the less state there is in these countries. And in this case, the prescription is to maximally exclude the state from the process of forming property rights.
For example, everyone is accustomed to state property registries. Why should they be state? Why can’t a database be private? And why can’t there be several of them? You will say “data from the state registry is recognized by the state court.” But what if we conduct transactions such that we resolve disputes through a pre-agreed arbiter? In general, there is a rich field for activity here.
But this is possibly not a prospect for today. Today, one can begin the process of displacing the state from the process of forming property rights. One of the tools for this is a system of mutual guarantees of property rights to certain property. This is the simplest, but it is the foundation for more complex things. For example, you have a “Lanos” car and an apartment in a Khrushchyovka building. On a special website, you declare this property and ask for guarantees. Suppose I am a lawyer, and I give you a guarantee and promise help if something happens to your Lanos. Others give guarantees on other matters. If, say, some cops want to take it from you, I can get involved. If your “Lanos” was taken on credit that you did not repay and now the bank wants to take it away, then I probably will not intervene. Each such case is recorded, noting whether you stood up for the unfortunate person or not, and why. Accordingly, your property, which you wish to protect in this way, is also guaranteed by someone. It is clear that in our conditions it is better to hide your property, since the tax service is hunting for it. But things happen. Perhaps you already pay tax on your “Lanos” and you don’t care. Gradually, such a system can grow into a network of mutual guarantees and arbitration that grows with it, which can begin to push the state out of the process of forming property rights. At least, participants in such a network no longer need it for transactions among themselves.