The events of December 2004, and namely the peaceful protest of Kyivans on the Maidan, as we can see, still set the tone in Ukrainian politics to this day. To this day this politics is presented as a confrontation between “orange” and “blue-white.” And although, by and large, there is no particular difference between them anymore (as the 2006 and 2007 elections showed), there are still fans of both parties, they constitute the majority of voters and, generally speaking, make their existence possible. Meanwhile, the phenomenon of the Maidan, in my humble opinion, is much more significant than its political consequences; without a doubt, it has enormous significance for Ukraine’s future. Unfortunately, it is difficult to separate it from the purely political context, and therefore, drawing a kind of summary of this phenomenon, we will have to recall the “political realities” again.
On the eve of the 2004 presidential elections, it was fashionable to talk about “Kuchma-3,” that is, some candidate (maybe Kuchma personally) who would represent the authorities at the elections and guarantee continuity of their policy. The author of these lines constantly asserted that Kuchma-3 was none other than Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko. His program (if one can even speak of a program) was not revolutionary; anyone could have endorsed it. Viktor Andriyovych was made a “revolutionary” by Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych. Or rather, if we get to the bottom of it, it was with Yanukovych that the Maidan protesters associated the danger of revolution. A criminal one. The practices of the “Donetsk people” shocked Kyiv’s business community and beyond. Yanukovych was the personification of instability and almost guaranteed changes for the worse. Yushchenko, in people’s opinion, at best could change something for the better, at worst would leave everything as is. Actually, people at the Maidan protested, including, against the instability that Yanukovych threatened them with. Therefore, considering Yanukovych a “continuer of Kuchma’s cause” and Yushchenko an “oppositionist” is not entirely correct. Other oppositions were at work here.
Those who still believe in American mittens constantly ask the question—why, they say, no one could predict such a massive demonstration by Kyivans. Where, they say, were the sociologists and others who are supposed to monitor this? And if they couldn’t predict it, then, of course, the Americans invented everything. Let’s try to figure it out. Let’s recall what was happening in 2004. Journalists and analysts actively discussed several topics related to possible election scenarios. The “third term” became an idée fixe of the Ukrainian political scene. Its convincing signs were seen both in the speeches of the authorities and in weather forecasts. The second important topic was “guarantees for Kuchma” and the closely related topic of the “successor”—a mysterious position whose name many journalists wrote with the letter “i,” which in itself is quite telling. Well, and finally, the third topic in this series was the “single candidate.” By the way, the initial absurdity of the “single candidate” topic passed unnoticed in a most astonishing way. After all, if elections are held in two rounds, then initially it turns out that two figures who make it to the second round automatically become “united”—there’s nothing to be done about that. Few doubted that one of these people would be a representative of the authorities, and the other of the opposition. Nevertheless, the topic was actively discussed until the end of the official nomination of presidential candidates. Journalists and analysts could not even imagine that the authorities would not devise some scenario guaranteeing them complete victory and a smooth transition to a bright future. No one wanted to think that the election procedure itself makes “guaranteed” scenarios impossible. And in this, perhaps, lies one of the main lessons of 2004. Observers became victims of the reality they themselves created, in which power was truly omnipotent and omnipresent. The authorities themselves also believed in this reality, as they continued to fight the media with astonishing persistence—the broadcasting of Radio Kontinent and Radio Svoboda was stopped, some newspapers closed. In order for the journalists’ and political commentators’ discussions of the elections that we read for a whole year to make sense, it was necessary… that the elections did not exist or were purely nominal, as in the USSR.
The second conclusion is connected with the first and concerns, actually, the peculiarities of political information as such. In Ukraine, media information is not equal to real significant information. And not only because of censorship, but primarily because the truly significant activities of the authorities are 90% backstage. It is not a verifiable fact; at best it is a rumor. Government decisions and its statements are not the main thing in our life; the main thing is its practice, which in most cases has no direct relation to these decisions.
Perhaps this is precisely the answer to the question—where did the orange revolution come from? It had indeed been ripening in society for a long time, but this process remained uncomprehended and even unrecorded by the analytical community. After all, the people who came out to the Maidan reacted not to the declarations of the authorities, fixed by the press, but to their practice and to the prospects of this practice after the presidential elections. For them, these prospects turned out to be absolutely unacceptable. The opposition, by the way, by itself had no effect whatsoever on the “revolutionary situation”; it simply found itself at hand at the right time.1 And one more fact in favor of our conclusion—from the very first days of the revolution, the authorities tried to present it as the result of technology, as a conspiracy that simply turned out to be better than the authorities’ own conspiracy. The presence of an independent and active people is inadmissible for that model of reality that the current elite lives by. This elite, by the way, includes not only those in power, but also most journalists and analysts regardless of party affiliation, as well as the overwhelming majority of currently active politicians. And, again regardless of party affiliation, today’s elite will try to regain the illusion of manipulating political processes, because they simply do not know how to act otherwise.
The Main Paradox of the Maidan
Let me also remind of a fact that is now preferred to be forgotten. Namely—the Yushchenko team after the second round of elections was preparing for surrender. Yes, its activists converged on the Maidan, but their goal was not to change the course of events, but to “draw the attention of the world community” and prepare acceptable conditions for surrender. The voluntary and mass activity of Kyivans surprised not only Kuchma’s administration, but also Yushchenko’s team.
As a result, we got a rather paradoxical situation. The revolution was provoked by the elections and was resolved within the election campaign. In other words, perhaps nothing like this would have happened if the authorities had had the sense to put forward a candidate who knows how to spell without errors. For this same reason we have that rare case when a revolution occurred absolutely spontaneously and did not produce its own leaders. Yushchenko and his company merely took advantage of the situation. It seems that our president is still convinced that people chanted “Yush-chen-ko!” because they passionately wanted to see Viktor Andriyovych in the presidential post. In reality, a large gathering of people always needs something to do. To chant something or sing. And, I will remind you, the election format dictates its own rules: if there is a political leader—why not chant his surname? “The leaders of the orange revolution” became such only due to the format of events—elections. They never understood what happened. This is especially easy to confirm if we recall with what populist positions “orange power” began its activities in the person of Tymoshenko2.
The Agenda of the Revolution
The “leaders” of the revolution are politicians of the Kuchma era, and therefore considered (and still consider) the people gathered in the square as ordinary “workers” to whom something needs to be “given.” This is exactly how Yulia Volodymyrivna and the president acted with their pensions, benefits, wages, and prices. Meanwhile, the people at the Maidan absolutely did not need any of this. Anyone who was there will confirm this. People came out to protest against the humiliation of their dignity; they needed a predictable and responsible government. Essentially, the Maidan was a bourgeois revolution.
What Are the Ideals of the Maidan and Can They Be “Betrayed”?
Usually Ukrainians hate each other. They consider the whole world a conspiracy, and define the main motive in life only as mercenary interest. They do not respect themselves or others. Such figures are absolutely irresponsible. They cannot be citizens. Their community represents a set of human atoms. They are easy to control and manipulate. And now, let us imagine that these, to use Plokhy’s expression, “human fragments,” suddenly gathered voluntarily and did something good. One can only guess what a storm of positive emotions raged in the souls of these people. It is precisely in this moment that we will find what is called “the ideals of the Maidan.” “The ideals of the Maidan” consist in smiling at strangers and saying “hello” to them. The ideals of the Maidan consist in understanding the power of solidarity and one’s individual choice—instead of “earning money,” going to freeze on the Maidan, possibly at risk to one’s life. These ideals do not have the form of a political program. “I want everything to be good” is not a program; it cannot be fulfilled or betrayed. Politicians have no relation to them at all, as these ideals are in the pre-political sphere. Our revolution consisted in the mastery of citizenship. For the first time, civic action was voluntary, had a clear goal, and produced a result.
What Is “Disappointment in the Revolution”?
In the “mass disappointment” that began to be talked about almost on the second day after the final victory of the “orange,” there are three different components. The first is, let’s say, “false enchantment.” Many for some reason believed that Yushchenko had a team and now it would be able to change something. When this did not happen, disappointment set in. The second component is more serious and has a psychological nature. It consists in a reaction to one’s own euphoria and resembles the usual postcoital syndrome. Surprise and delight after everything turned out exactly as it should (and, let us note, for the first time—after all, this was the first Ukrainian revolution) cannot pass without consequences. The degree of euphoria as it were presupposed that “now everything will definitely be fine,” and when this does not happen, irritation sets in. The third component is especially interesting. Paradoxically, the first to speak of “disappointment” in the “orange revolution” were its ardent opponents, who, it would seem, should not have been enchanted by it at all. The media of eastern Ukraine frothed with venom and gloating starting from around February 2005. Most likely, we were dealing with an irrational process. This is the reaction of oppressed people who consider this oppression the natural order of things; it is the jealousy of an old maid toward a loving couple, the jealousy of those accustomed to humiliation toward those who managed to stand up for (in the literal sense of the word) their dignity. In the texts of the “opposition” of that time, the world picture of these people is easily discernible. In this world, only violence, calculation, and personal gain rule. Everything human, from the point of view of such an audience, is a hypocritical mask. It creates the impression that the phrase “dark forces oppress us wickedly” is inscribed in these people’s birth certificates, next to their surnames. The orange revolution greatly shook this picture of the world, and the “failure” of the new authorities returned it to its place. Hence the gloating that has not left these people to this day. They rejoice that the point of view “everyone around is a scoundrel,” in their opinion, has been brilliantly confirmed.
The Significance of the Maidan
The question arises: why did we encounter this murky flow only in 2004? After all, these people were not born yesterday. Possibly, the answer is that for the first time such a reaction was caused by internal Ukrainian events. Until now, the east simply did not pay attention to the rest of Ukraine; the “orange revolution” forced it to do so. The hysteria of the east indicates that it has now also become Ukrainian, for denial is evidence of acknowledgment. Therefore, one of the results of the Maidan was the unification of Ukraine. De facto, for the first time since 1991, we obtained a common political space throughout the country. The second, possibly even more important result—the Maidan showed the possibility of productive civic action. This fact completely changed the relationship between authorities and society at a very deep level. It does not matter what else happens in our history—the precedent of a successful peaceful movement in a positive direction has already been created. Third, I would place the debunking of some self-reassuring myths, for example: “what can I do alone?” It turned out that one very much can. And, finally, fourth point—the Maidan can be considered the birthday of the Ukrainian nation. Let us recall that the Maidan was also the center of political life in the early 90s. Only it differed radically from what we saw in 2004.
The new Maidan showed that over 13 years a generation grew up in which there are people capable of self-organization. They have already achieved something in life and achieved it through their own labor; they plan their future and strive to make it better. And therefore, for them the situation when their fate could end up in someone else’s hands is completely unacceptable. They do not intend to give their future to anyone. This concreteness is what turns the “population” into citizens who may not be particularly politically active in everyday life, but as soon as it comes to vital situations, voluntarily go to defend their rights. This concreteness is what distinguishes the old Maidan from the new one. At the old Maidan3, plans were made about how to arrange Ukraine, what where and how should lie in the “Ukrainian house,” who we should befriend and why. This concerned “everyone” and no one in particular. At the new Maidan, people came to defend the individual future of each, without going into details. And if at the old Maidan there was arguing, and they could never come to a common opinion, here such is not even required. At the same time, here is a unity that they could not even dream of before.