The past few days have been a perfect illustration of the eternal Ukrainian story about rakes. To remind you: attempts began to disarm volunteers and other “illegal armed formations,” restrictions on volunteer activities tightened, Avakov and Poroshenko spoke out against citizens’ right to bear arms, and, following a conflict, Kolomoysky was dismissed as governor of Dnipropetrovsk.
That is, the president and his cronies openly moved against the Ukrainians. In this case, I am referring to what a significant portion of Ukrainians identify as “for” and “against”—since, for example, they typically ignore the government’s economic policies, which are always “against,” simply because they don’t understand them. So, in this case, moves were made in the realm of “ordinary” politics, where everyone considers themselves an expert, and these moves, to put it mildly, have surprised the general public.
There is actually nothing surprising here. All of this was clear from the very beginning and completely inevitable, since the system is always stronger than the individual. What we’re dealing with here is the interests of a centralized bureaucratic system. Putin does not threaten this system; he is dangerous only to certain “top” figures within it, and even then only to the extent that he might catch them off guard with their belongings still unpacked. Everyone else is confident that their services will be needed under any regime. The only thing they would want to avoid is a major war, destruction, and similar inconveniences. Therefore, the system as a whole favors the terrifying and awful Russian army that cannot be defeated (“there is no military solution to the conflict,” as we remember) and favors peace at any price, including, of course, explicit or covert capitulation.
The real threat to the system is people who have more “degrees of freedom” than is permitted. An oligarch who has taken control of an entire “administrative-territorial unit” is very bad for the system. Volunteer battalions, over which, no matter how you look at it, there will never be the same control as over units made up of mobilized Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel rounded up from fields and forests, are an even greater threat. And a citizen freely owning weapons is simply a nightmare. And the system acts quite logically, fighting the greatest threats to itself. The fact that these threats do not coincide with what Ukrainians consider threats is another matter.
It should be noted that “establishing order” and “building a vertical” has never yet succeeded. It provokes resistance, which ultimately changes power. By the way, it would be useful to remember that the most active order-establishers included Viktor Fyodorovych Yanukovych, who made considerable efforts in this direction, for which ungrateful Ukrainians organized the Maidan for him.
It is quite possible that we will now witness another repetition of this story, this time in the form of “good Kolomoysky versus bad Poroshenko.” Kolomoysky has resources, and besides, not much effort will be needed here—after “establishing order” in the army, the General Staff’s ability to organize encirclements will greatly increase, so everything could happen on its own: military defeat, elections, Kolomoysky. And you know what Igor Valeriyevich will do once he takes the president’s chair or wherever he ends up? Establish order and build a vertical. The system is stronger than the individual, and therefore Kolomoysky will step on the same rake.
What seems to me interesting and important is the following. It appears that in Ukraine one can speak not of one, but of two systems of parasitism: on one hand, this is a cargo-state, a centralized bureaucratic system “on the European model,” and on the other—a specific Ukrainian feudalism. Usually, when we talk about feudalism here, they mean some underdevelopment of the state, as if it is still wild and feudal here, unlike in Europe. In reality, however, this is a fully functional system that allows survival and adaptation to the state, orienting parasites toward practices different from those prescribed by the centralized model—practices that leave working people a place to live and even some prosperity. Ukrainian feudalism is an old, time-tested form of Ukrainians’ adaptation to a “vertical” state that has always been, is, and will be hostile to them.
It is precisely the existence of this second system, which, unlike the state, is at least partially oriented toward the survival of its victims, that is the secret that explains the Ukrainian game of stepping on rakes. After all, the pressure of the state is exerted not only on the interests of people but also on the interests of officials within the feudal system; therefore, opposition to the state and current bosses is built on feudal slogans and supported by the feudal system.
Igor Valeriyevich, or whoever replaces him, will speak to us about small business, economic freedom, decentralization of power, and the like, since this is what Ukrainian feudalism desires. The system is stronger than the individual, and to gain its support, one must act in its interests. All our presidents came to power under feudal slogans, and Kuchma and Yanukovych (with known limitations) even had a regional component in their programs. The paradox here is that victory in elections transplants the winner from one system to another, and he begins to work in its interests already. Since the interests of the two systems are largely mutually exclusive, they can coexist only by not showing much activity, in the mode of “armed neutrality.” However, the longer this goes on, the harder it is to maintain such neutrality, since the state expands simply by its nature; accordingly, conflicts will occur more and more often.
And here one must remember that the plot of “king versus barons” with the obligatory victory of the king is not a universal pattern at all, as they drill into us from the school bench. Progress and capitalism were precisely where kings failed. England, not some France, ruled the seas and was the workshop of the world.
In our case, it generally seems that the “king versus barons” model is not applicable to Ukraine, since kings and barons are different interests within one system, while in Ukraine one can speak of two—albeit closely intertwined—systems, and the state is always the more artificial and foreign system imposed from outside.
Who will win in the struggle of systems is difficult to say. So far it seems that the victory of the state is possible only under external pressure, and then only with actual support. The victory of the feudal system, which would open at least some prospects of development for Ukrainians, is hindered by the fact that this system works through the political machine—that is, elections, propaganda, and subsequent seizure of the state. This guarantees the regular repetition of stepping on rakes.
In any case, we will change nothing here until we realize how the real (that is, feudal) system in which we live is arranged and how it functions. After all, in reality, “political science” in our country studies anything but the surrounding reality. We know very little about Ukrainian feudalism, and our attitude toward it (“shadow economy,” “corruption”) is built on the clichés of state propaganda.