The current conflict between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko offers a good opportunity to consider how deeply systemic it truly is, to what extent it stems from objective causes—the political model that has taken shape in our country over the past seventeen years.
Indeed, the conflict between the prime minister and the president is a typical story for Ukraine. I would remind you that Presidents Kuchma and Yushchenko are both former prime ministers who were “not allowed to work” by their presidents. In addition, these same presidents also “did not allow” other prime ministers to work—politicians who at different times tried to become president or, at the very least, positioned themselves as oppositionists. Marchuk, Lazarenko, Yanukovych, and even Pustovoitenko are names that immediately come to mind.
Obviously, beyond the usual career considerations of “political growth,” there are also objective reasons for this state of affairs. Perhaps they lie in the specifics of the presidential office itself.
The Special President
Let me remind you that “presidents” in Ukraine, and in other post-Soviet countries, have nothing in common with the office that was invented in the United States at the end of the 18th century. This is due to the conditions under which this office was introduced into our political mechanism. In our case, we can speak of two peculiarities. The first is that when the Soviet Union collapsed, the only model of governance known to the Ukrainian bureaucracy and sufficiently mastered was the scheme of the Central Committee—the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers dealt with “economic matters” and was accountable both to the Soviet authorities and to the Central Committee. The Central Committee, in turn, was an unaccountable governing body in this system. The Central Committee was part of another—the party—hierarchy. The “president” in our version became a substitute for the Central Committee. This was done very simply. The legitimacy of the CPSU, based on direct violence, was replaced by the classical legitimacy of an elected official, but our president did not receive those powers and, consequently, that responsibility for which, actually, he is elected in the United States. The second peculiarity is deeper. It consists in the fact that the “president,” especially with those vague powers that our president has, is an ideal figure for the Ukrainian model. The Ukrainian president is a kind of “batko,” a certain chief of chiefs, who, by virtue of his authority (and, we note, nothing more), deals with “solving issues.”
In 1996, these peculiarities of the presidential office were recorded in the Constitution. Those who say that Kuchma had many powers under that Constitution are mistaken. This is not the case. What mattered was not the scope of powers, but their character. The president’s powers were such that he could use them, first, at his discretion, second—informally.
So, one can say that in Ukraine there exists a governance model in which the prime minister performs the function of normative governance and, by virtue of this, is in the sphere of public politics, parliamentary procedure, etc. The president performs the role of an “informal leader” who “solves issues” and de facto controls the prime minister. It seems that the source of constant conflict lies precisely here.
President and Prime Minister. Village and State
If we look at our protagonists from the perspective of governance models (formal-normative and informal), then the picture of their interaction will be approximately as follows.
The president embodies the “rural” principle in Ukraine. He is a specialist in “solving issues,” his function is arbitration. Accordingly, to implement this function, he stands above the law and any formalities whatsoever. The president does not engage in normative governance; he “activates” this role at his discretion when it is necessary to “adjust” the actions of the Cabinet.
The prime minister is a “manager,” an “economic operator,” he is primarily in the normative-procedural plane. The prime minister depends on parliament and on the team of officials he leads. Without the president, the prime minister is a typical classical state position, the highest in the hierarchy of officials.
The president inevitably “begets” the prime minister, because the president must be an arbiter. He cannot regularly act in the public sphere; he can only “appear” in it, as both Kuchma and Yushchenko demonstrated to us.
The prime minister is “not allowed to work” precisely in his public-normative sphere. This happens when the president “activates” and “solves issues” not as was provided by the course of bureaucratic procedure.
The prime minister, acting against the president, acts in the public sphere. This is where the electoral resource lies, which sympathizes with the prime minister, seeing that indeed, yes, they are not being allowed to work.
The president is unable to cope with a rebellious prime minister, because he performs the role of arbiter in informal relations that are invisible to the ordinary person. He simply has nothing to present to voters. The president inevitably loses to the prime minister (if, of course, the latter acts at least somewhat consistently), the former prime minister becomes president, and the cycle repeats. This “division of labor” took shape in 1996, when Kuchma refused what was initially assumed by the constitutional draft—that the president should head the executive power.
“Elites” Choose the President
In politics, there are undoubtedly quite strict rules. However, most of them are not recorded anywhere, if only because the people following these rules usually believe they are acting on their own will. In the competition of two main positions—president and prime minister—our “elites” bet on the president, even without noticing it themselves. This happened quite recently, when political reform took away part of the president’s powers, and most importantly—the right to dismiss the Cabinet. The prime minister, meanwhile, received almost dictatorial powers far exceeding the powers of prime ministers in countries with a parliamentary system.
Further, history set up an experiment—in 2006-2007, a conflict began between the president and the Rada (and, accordingly, the prime minister, as the leader of the majority). The president dissolved the Rada, his position was quite vulnerable, as the legality of the dissolution was highly questionable.
And what do we see? We see the prime minister (Yanukovych) trying with all his might to reconcile with the president, not vice versa! The “elites” chose between a strong, but acting in the normative plane prime minister and a weak, but informal president. The choice was made in favor of the president. What followed was even more interesting. The “elites” effectively placed the president where he stood before the political reform, de facto restoring his role of arbiter through their own behavior and agreement with the president’s behavior, even without that ingenious legal construct (above all, the right to dismiss the Cabinet) that was in the 1996 constitution and with the help of which Comrade Kuchma obtained the role of arbiter. The construct is already gone, but the role is still being fulfilled!
What Is Wrong with All This
All this means that the “elites” prefer to continue acting behind the scenes. One can easily identify several consequences of this state of affairs:
A system with a president-arbiter is predisposed to restriction, to simplification. No one person can be an arbiter for everyone who wants one. Therefore, the circle of close associates is narrow and tends to shrink. All known mechanisms of “negative selection” are activated; in our case, the replacement of Zynchenko with Baloha serves as a good illustration.
As a result, the economy is also organized according to the principle of “crony arrangements.” The Ukrainian budget is filled by about a hundred “respected people,” they also divide the money coming from VAT; in Ukraine there are only two or three export articles. This is simply unbelievable for such a large country.
The presidential position, which is considered by the “elites” to be the “main” one, creates false goals for politicians. An example is the same Yushchenko, who, most likely, really wanted to benefit the country, became president for this purpose, and, of course, nothing worked out for him. It is believed that he himself is to blame for this, and the next candidates are already ready to replace him in this position.
The president-arbiter makes laws and formal procedures unnecessary in their direct capacity. There is simply no demand for them. Norms play only an instrumental role, “formalizing” certain actions. The entire domestic jurisprudence is built on this, which, generally speaking, should be called something else.
And finally, the obvious conclusion that the coexistence of president and prime minister generates constant political conflict. And here it is not at all necessary for them to be competitors; they can be the best of friends, but conflict will inevitably arise. I remind you that all Ukrainian prime ministers, with the exception of Tymoshenko, were “the president’s people.” This did not help at all to avoid conflict.