Democracy 2.0. Project State Against Stripping State

So we have established that all states function according to the “common pot” principle, which allows them to finance barely useful and even harmful activities, and most importantly, to independently determine what activities they wish to engage in using our money.

The “common pot” principle can be considered, to some extent, an inevitable evil that could be tolerated since there was no technological alternative to it. Now such an alternative exists: the internet.

Correctly Formulated Question

In understanding many things, a correct formulation of the problem plays a very important role. Tell me, do you consider state licensing of entrepreneurial activity necessary? Perhaps you do. But now let us formulate the question differently—do you personally agree to pay for this licensing? That is, voluntarily pay specifically for these purposes? Most likely, no. If you had the opportunity, you would not pay for financing state licensing, although you “generally” consider it useful.

The “common pot” principle forces us to consider some clearly unnecessary types of activity as “generally” useful. After all, it is unknown who specifically pays for them, since “everyone pays together.” But the trouble is—the “service” that “everyone pays for together” is always received by a specific person. And he encounters a mass of problems that are absolutely unnecessary for him personally and for which he personally would not have given a rotten penny. And this happens almost always. Activities considered “generally” useful in their specific implementation are often harmful, and almost always simply unnecessary for anyone.

There is only one way to avoid this—pay yourself for what is necessary.

Internet

In this note, I will not talk about what principles should underlie the existence of a project state or how to transition to it from our current state. I will also not talk about why this type of state, which is becoming quite realistic given the existence of necessary technologies, is extremely necessary for Ukraine specifically, and why it is possible precisely here. For now, let us focus on the very principle of the project state and compare it with the budget state.

First, let us note what the internet actually changes in the technology of communication between the state and the citizen. The internet allows maintaining large volumes of information in constant access, available at a time convenient for the user, with (relatively) convenient means of searching.

The internet allows constant discussion of certain activities, the formation of groups of interested parties, and the distribution of information about these activities, again at a time convenient for the participants.

The internet allows payment at a time convenient for the user, and it also allows getting your money back.

The internet allows conducting certain activities online—for example, tracking the execution of a particular budget and direct budget execution.

Projects

Tell me, do you personally need some ministry of transport? Most likely, no. And do you need the activity that by fate falls under its jurisdiction? Perhaps some of it is indeed useful and necessary. Then why do you pay “for the ministry” and not for its activity? More precisely, why do you not have a choice among a set of activities that this respected institution engages in? And why does it itself come up with what to occupy itself with?

The priority of structure over activity is characteristic of the “common pot” state, when we pay “in general” for the existence of structures that can carry out any activity whatsoever.

The priority of activity over structure is implemented in the project principle. Projects have a beginning and an end, clear goals and means of their implementation, and finally, they have a budget. Structures are created for the execution of specific projects and are liquidated after their completion.

Project State

So, let us imagine a situation where parties, instead of their stupid programs, which, as we remember, “nobody reads,” offer the people a set of projects for state activity. They offer them before elections, and in case of victory, these projects begin to be implemented.

Projects exist in the form of websites, on which the projects themselves and their budgets are fully described. The websites, I repeat, are created before elections, which gives everyone who wishes the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the project, discuss it, criticize it, and so on.

If a party has won, its projects are opened for financing. That is, interested parties transfer money to the website until a budget is formed (this is easy to track online). In case of “underfunding,” money is returned and the project is not implemented.

As I have already said, I will not now consider the organization of such a state. I want to note only three most important points that will really bring much greater clarity. The first is that payers in such a system should only be private individuals. Corporations (that is, legal entities) should not pay any taxes. The second point is that the number of votes a citizen has in elections depends on the percentage of income that he spent on financing projects. The third point: payment for projects is a voluntary matter.

Now let us simply compare the properties of the project state and the budget state. I am writing the first things that come to mind; other positions for comparison are probably possible. (See the table on the next page)