In a situation where it is completely unclear how political events will develop, I think we should speak about what definitely cannot happen: dictatorship.
Let me be clear. Various “force scenarios,” up to pogroms and civil war, are quite probable, but they cannot end in a full-fledged, stable, and self-assured dictatorship, such as exists, for example, in Russia. At least within existing borders.
Among the reasons why dictatorship in Ukraine is possible only as a temporary phenomenon, the most commonly cited is cost. We have no hydrocarbons or other fashionable resources, no Russia will feed four more Belaruses, the economy is over-regulated and cannot be “regulated,” because the security apparatus that sustains the regime feeds directly on it, and so on. That is, since under dictatorship one must usually feed not only the security apparatus but also the people it “protects,” all this requires significant additional resources that Ukraine simply doesn’t have. And if so, then dictatorship here won’t work.
This is certainly true, but there is another reason why, as it seems to me, dictatorship has no great prospects here, regardless of whether the potential dictator has money and the ability to “feed the people.” This reason is the established system of relations, which can safely be compared to feudalism.
Feudalism is a complex system of intersecting jurisdictions. The usual school understanding of feudalism presents us with a “matryoshka” of jurisdictions linked to titles of land ownership on some territory: “baron” — “count” — “duke” — “king.” However, in reality this system is much more complex; it includes not only the aristocratic “matryoshka” but also cities (often actually independent), local communities, the church, knightly and ecclesiastical orders (the last three structures go beyond “national” frameworks), as well as guilds and merchant associations.
Most of these structures have their own law and their own courts, and often their own armed forces. All this existed thanks to a complex system of treaties, but to a greater extent thanks to customary law.
Importantly, there is no rigid hierarchy here, of the sort we are accustomed to seeing in the “nation-state.” “Orders from above” will be greeted with bayonets. Yes, the vassal is obligated to provide troops to the suzerain, but only forty days a year. And so it is in every matter. In principle, it is precisely these features of feudalism—that is, the absence of a rigid power vertical penetrating all of society—that became the foundation of the future triumph of the West.
Why and how the “nation-state” defeated the feudal system is a big question not entirely relevant to our topic. What is important is to note that this victory does not mean that “life has become better, life has become merrier.” Quite the opposite, rather. Prussian ordnung ultimately led Germany to defeat in two world wars, and its postwar success it owes precisely to the sharp weakening of ordnung. Moreover, there is a clear pattern: the less ordnung penetrated society along with the “nation-state,” the more prosperity and success it had (Britain in the nineteenth century).
However, let us return to our sheep. As is usually the case, the real structure of our state is little studied and undescribed. We believe that we live in a “nation-state,” while in reality it is something completely different, much more resembling feudalism. Perform a mental experiment: whom will you turn to “if something happens”—the state or the “right people”? In a real nation-state, people turn to the right people extremely rarely. Here, they turn to them first of all, as they say, in sorrow and in joy.
Ukrainian feudalism is still awaiting its researcher. For now, one can confidently say that its distinctive feature is that its basis is not peasants with land, but enterprises and legal entities in general. They are precisely the “titles” for which the struggle between “lords” is fought, and the owners of which are always ready to fight, and not only with litigation.
Overall, until recently, feudal groupings were quite visible. And if you started to become interested in how everything is arranged inside, you would discover a whole conglomeration of groupings that, in turn, were also divided into smaller groupings, and so on down to pan i pidpank1. At the same time, it is important that these small groupings are not simply part of larger ones, but intersect with each other and often go beyond the “main” grouping.
I could share quite extensive observations, but for our topic what is important here is this: the “boss” who is on the surface (and usually appears as an “oligarch”) does not have full and unconditional power in his grouping. Journalists often call such formations “business empires,” but they are very far from empires. The “oligarch” can count on the execution of commands at levels directly below him, and further down questions begin. At the same time, practically all legal entities in the country are explicitly or implicitly integrated into some conglomerates. Any kiosk has “roof,”2 but the kiosk owner usually has no idea which “empire” he belongs to. Most often, the “roof” of the first, and even the second level, does not suspect this either.
The Ukrainian political system well reflects this feudalism. The president is a position whose powers were specifically created to “resolve issues” and not depend on the “oligarchs.” It is telling that even before Yanukovych cancelled the political reform, the “late” Yushchenko already acted effectively outside its framework. The system restored itself.
One can relate to such a system in various ways, but the fact is that it works for self-reproduction and prevents the usurpation of power by any one person. I have many times observed how conflicts are resolved within this system; for our topic it is important that bonapartes and thugs found themselves in isolation, and sometimes faced direct sabotage. And all this because the system is decentralized, and its participants do not exactly know the capabilities of each other. Sometimes there were fantastic cases when in some crisis situation one could receive a call from a completely unexpected “important person,” and one could only guess how and why they were “reached.”
Now let us return again to dictatorship. Any regime exists only because its victims agree to it and support it. For an ordinary person to make a real choice in favor of dictatorship, he must understand why he is giving up freedom. That is why, by the way, “popular love” and faith in the leader, etc., are so important for the victory of dictatorship: they significantly reduce the price of freedom.
Of course, each case of dictatorship is unique, but this mechanism is universal. It is called “seeking consent” and is the method by which the state expands; it is inherent in all states, of which dictatorship is a particular case.
Choosing dictatorship is, above all, a choice in favor of ordnung, that is, a choice of rigid hierarchy. Of course, ordnung is very popular. Some hope to protect themselves with it, others hope to attack, those who are nobody’s “guy” hope to become one. But no one has any doubts that “everything will be like in grandmother’s time,” that is, that ordnung will only be the external side of things, a formal pretext or “cover story.”
A Ukrainian can easily vote for ordnung, support it fervently and sincerely, but he will resolve issues the way he is accustomed to, that is, within the framework of feudal practices. For him to actually, and not just in words, choose ordnung, the latter must give a better result in “resolving issues,” but this, precisely in our case, it cannot do by definition.
That is, any dictator, even one who enjoys love and support, will inevitably face sabotage, all the more dangerous because a significant part of it is carried out unconsciously by those very people who support him.
In fact, one of the main permanent conflicts in which we exist is the conflict between feudal practices and ordnung. For a Ukrainian, feudal practices are used for privatizing income, and ordnung for nationalizing costs. A vivid example is “office hamsters”3 who receive their salary in a feudal envelope and at the same time fervently support, let us say, the smoking ban, trying to nationalize their costs on this issue. Characteristically, the “oligarchs” whom they do not like act exactly the same way, and that is precisely why they are “oligarchs.”
A particular case of this problem is the “Donetsk people.” Unlike other Ukrainians, they understand ordnung well and understand feudalism poorly. This explains the manic persistence with which power tries to put “their own” people in all possible state positions. In fact, all this time Yanukovych has been trying to exterminate Ukrainian feudalism, which ultimately led to the conflict we are observing. However, in the nearest historical perspective this task is unsolvable, because, I repeat, people will change their habits only if ordnung works better than feudalism.
It is interesting that the replacement with “their own” also did not yield results. A fresh example was encountered in an interview with SBU4 General Skibinetsky in Nova Gazeta. The general says: “Yes. An interesting nuance I noticed the other day. People in high positions who have not answered calls for a year or two suddenly call themselves. They are wavering. Restoring contacts just in case…”. This is how the feudal system works.
In general, as a conclusion, the following can be said:
So far, the feudal system has been not only, as many think, a brake, but also saved us from unpleasant developments in critical situations (at least in 2004). Overall, Ukraine’s diversity is not a minus but a plus. If we did not have “east and west,” if we had one church instead of three, if ordnung had defeated feudalism, then most likely one form of dictatorship or another would have long been established.
The progressive public and claimants to the throne should think about how feudalism is structured, rather than trying to break it over the knee.
From my point of view, feudalism is more promising than ordnung. In fact, it does not impede the movement from unification to contract, from “this is provided by law” to a system of reputation and guarantees. Such feudalism is promising; it, as they say, “advances on its own,” on the wave of the technological revolution. We, as usual, are trying to jump onto the departing train of the “nation-state,” while possessing far more effective skills and practices.